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A Different Look at the Taxation of
Corporate Distributions and Shareholder Gain
Charles R. 0 'Kelley, Jr. *
The taxation of corporate distributions and shareholder gain is
an area of the Internal Revenue Code which has fostered a seem-
ingly never-ending yet never-successful attempt by the Courts and
Congress to design a coherent, non-discriminatory regime. In this
article, Mr. O'Kelley sets forth a proposal for a logical system for
treating corporate distributions to shareholders which would
strengthen the double tax scheme, and eliminate its present
loopholes.
The present scheme of corporate-shareholder taxation subjects a cor-
poration's taxable income to the corporate tax.' The after-tax earnings
of the corporation may be accumulated provided the corporation is not
a personal holding company2 or is not subject to the accumulated earn-
ings tax.3 Upon distribution of a corporation's after-tax earnings in the
form of a dividend, each non-corporate recipient shareholder includes
in his or her gross income the dividend's fair market value.4
The burden of this double taxation of the gain recognized by a cor-
poration may be greatly reduced if the distribution qualifies as a
redemption under section 302(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, as a
partial liquidation under section 33 1(a)(2), or as a complete liquidation
under section 331(a)(1). Such distributions are treated as being in part
*B.A., University of the South, 1970; J.D., University of Texas, 1972; LL.M., Harvard
University, 1977; Associate, Dodd, Driver, Connell & Hughes, Atlanta, Ga.
1. Pursuant to I.R.C. § 11 corporate earnings are subject to a flat rate tax at the corporate
level. For taxable years ending after December 31, 1974 and before January 1, 1979, § II provides
for a tax equal to the sum of (1) 20%/o of the portion of taxable income not in excess of $25,000, (2)
22% of the portion of taxable income in excess of $25,000, but not in excess of $50,000, and (3)
48% of the portion of taxable income in excess of $50,000.
2. I.R.C. §§ 541-547.
3. I.R.C. §§ 531-537.
4. I.R.C. §§ 301, 316. The first $100 of a dividend may qualify for exclusion. I.R.C. § 116.
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or full payment in exchange for the stock of the recipient shareholder,
and the shareholder is, therefore, entitled to capital gains treatment for
any gain, rather than being required to include in his or her gross in-
come the distribution's value.' Concerning complete liquidations,
Code section 337 allows a further reduction in the burden of the double-
taXt system by exempting from the corporate tax most gain recognized
by a corporation after the adoption of a plan of complete liquida-
tion. Likewise, Code sections 311 and 336 exempt a corporation from
taxation of the appreciation in value of its property if such property is
distributed to its shareholders with respect to its stock or in partial or
complete liquidation. Together, sections 311, 336, and 337 provide
significant opportunities for a corporation to avoid taxation on the
appreciation in value of its assets.
These present provisions discriminate against continuing corpora-
tions, 6 and Congress has been unable or unwilling to eliminate this in-
equity by strengthening the double tax system.I For instance, Code
section 341 requires that a shareholder's gain from the liquidation of a
"collapsible corporation" shall be treated as ordinary income. A
"collapsible corporation" is one used by its shareholders for the pur-
pose of converting ordinary income into capital gains.' From section
5. Capital gains and losses are governed by I.R.C. subch. P. Stock normally will be a capital
asset under I.R.C. § 1221. I.R.C. § 1222(3) defines long term capital gain as "gain from the sale
or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months [9 months for taxable years beginning
in 1977; 1 year for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1977]." Net capital gains are taxed
more favorably than ordinary income under I.R.C. §§ 1201 and 1202. The exact extent of the
preference resulting from capital gains treatment over ordinary income treatment depends on the
application of the minimum tax provisions of I.R.C. §§ 56-58 and to the circumstances of each
taxpayer.
6. The phrase "continuing corporation" is used in this article to refer to corporations which,
assuming their business is successful, are not formed or availed of with a view to liquidation, and
are operated in a manner which periodically results in the payment of corporate tax by the cor-
poration and income tax on dividends by the shareholders. The antithesis of acontinuing corpora-
tion is a collapsible one. See note 8, infra.
7. In the judgment of one commentator:
[These sections] hardly pay lip service to the 'double-tax system.' Congress has sawed
off the tailgate of the corporate tax wagon. In so doing, it has weighted the tax system in
favor of business liquidators and traders and against continuing owners. The latter are
exposed to the double tax; the former (provided they escape that erratic policeman, the
'collapsible corporation' provision) are not.
JAMES B. LEWIS, A PROPOSED NEW TREATMENT FOR CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS AND SALES IN
LIQUIDATION, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE
TAx BASE, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1644-45 (1959).
8. According to I.R.C. § 341(b)(l), a
collapsible corporation is a corporation formed or availed of principally for the
manufacture, construction or production of property, for the purchase of property...
or for the holding of stock in a corporation so formed or availed of, with a view to -
(A) the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders (whether in liquidation or other-
wise), or a distribution to its shareholders, before the realization by the corporation
... of a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from such property, and
(B) the realization by such shareholders of gain attributable to such property.
[Vol. 13:1
1977] CORPORATE DISTRIBUTION AND SHAREHOLDER GAIN 91
341, it is clear that Congress felt a corporation must be used for more
than the conversion of ordinary income into capital gains.' While com-
mentators have argued that the only difference between a "collapsible"
and other corporations is that the former was established with liquida-
tion in mind,' 0 it is probable that almost all corporations are formed
with a view to this possibility. I  Thus, by focusing on a narrow prob-
lem, the collapsible corporation provision attacks only a small number
of the areas where corporate liquidators are favored over continuing
corporations. As with section 341, other Code provisions collectively
demonstrate that Congress, when faced with the reality of blatant con-
version of ordinary income into capital gains, has moved to plug the
hole. In each instance, however, an emphasis on the immediate prob-
lem may have blinded Congress to the fact that after each hole has been
repaired, the continuing corporation is still discriminated against.
One way to eliminate this discrimination would be to provide that all
distributions by a corporation to its shareholders and all gain real-
ized by a shareholder upon the sale of his or her stock would be treated
as ordinary income or that all such gains would be treated as capital
gains.' 3 However, major philosophical and practical considerations
would be faced by Congress if it considered ending the capital gains
preference. I" This article solely concentrates on the problems which the
9. Abuse in this area became apparent in the motion picture industry. See O'Brien v. Com-
missioner, 25 T.C. 376 (1955).
10. Bittker and Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAX L. REV. 437, 439
(1950).
11. The incorporators will be concerned about whether to issue § 1244 stock in order to
preserve the possibility of ordinary loss in the event the corporation is unsuccessful, about the
possibilities of putting in some of their investment as debt to protect them in relation to outside
creditors in the event of bankruptcy, and about the various possibilities of terminating their invest-
ment at low tax cost. See Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958), for an excellent discus-
sion of the issues involved when a bankruptcy court attempts to subordinate the claims of
shareholders of a failed venture. Most taxpayers will submit to the corporate form only after tak-
ing a good look at all possible tax consequences including liquidation, and will conduct its cor-
porate affairs in a manner likely to minimize its ultimate tax burden.
12. See I.R.C. §§ 305, 306, 302(b) and 318.
13. I.R.C. § 331 provides that amounts distributed in partial or complete liquidation of a cor-
poration shall be treated as payment in exchange for stock. I.R.C. § 302 provides that amounts
distributed in a qualified redemption shall be treated as payment in exchange for stock. Under
I.R.C. subch. P, such gains are entitled to capital gains treatment. Under I.R.C. § 301 the amount
of dividend distributions is included in the gross income of the recipient, and therefore is subject to
taxation at ordinary income rates. Because of this advantage resulting from the successful
characterization of a distribution as being in redemption or in partial or complete liquidation, as
opposed to its characterization as a dividend, much tax planning and litigation has its origin in the
attempt to cloak a corporate distribution in other than the form of a dividend. If the capital gains
preference is eliminated, then the importance of such characterizations will be greatly reduced as
will be the discrimination against continuing corporations.
14. The major reasons for and against preferential tax treatment of capital gains are sum-
marized in Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247 (1957). See
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preference creates within the corporate tax scheme and suggests that
such difficulties can be obviated without terminating the capital gains
preference in its entirety. Thus, a major focus is the development of a
logical system for determining when capital gains treatment is to be
afforded to a shareholder upon his or her receipt of a corporate
distribution with respect to, or in exchange for, his or her stock.
A proposal is set forth for treatment of corporate distributions to
shareholders which is based on the promise that continuing corpora-
tions and its shareholders should be favored by the tax laws rather than
temporary corporations. The proposal is based on the assumption that
the double taxation of corporate gain is the desired system,' 5 that
shareholders normally should receive corporate distributions as
dividends treated as ordinary income, but that in some cases the gains
realized by shareholders upon their receipt of distributions in redemp-
tion, or in partial or complete liquidation, should be entitled to capital
gains treatment rather than as ordinary income. Thus, there is no
attempt to consider the relative merits of various integration proposals
as opposed to the double tax system or the comparative advantages of
preferential as opposed to ordinary tax treatment of capital gains. In-
stead, this article seeks to develop a proposal which strengthens the
double tax system by affording preferential treatment of shareholder
gain on corporate distributions in redemption or liquidation only to
shareholders whose corporations ("Fully Qualified Corporations" or
"Fully Qualifying Corporations") have been operated in a manner,
justified by its dividend history, to qualify its shareholders for such
preferential treatment.
First, this article offers a proposed test for determining whether a
corporation is Fully Qualified. Next, we develop and test the proposal
also TREASURY TAx STUDY, FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
(1951). Though the Carter administration apparently will recommend the abolishment of the
capital gains preference, Boston Globe, Sept. 25, 1977, at CI col. 2; TIME, Sept. 26, 1977, at 85, it
is impossible to predict whether Congress will concur. Certainly, there will be stiff opposition to
such proposal based upon the need for such treatment to foster capital investment. One reason
given for preferential treatment of capital gains is that it compensates for the distortion to an in-
dividual's tax burden resulting from the lumping of a capital gain entirely into one year and com-
pensates for the unfairness of taxing as gain what is, in reality, only inflation. Another problem
with eliminating the preferential treatment of capital gains is the fear that such will discourage
prompt realization of gains, and thus actually decrease the taxes collected.
15. An in depth analysis of the desirability of the double tax system is beyond the scope of
this article. If the burden of the corporate tax is totally shifted from the shareholders to others,
there is, in reality, no double taxation. If such a result occurs, then, the present system of "double
taxation" becomes merely an efficient method by which the government collects taxes; it becomes
a system the worth of which is difficult to challenge. See M. KRZYZANIAK & R. A. MUSGRAVE,
THE SHIFTING OF THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX (1963); Goode, Who Bears the Corporation In-
come Tax? 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 410 (1969); Stiglitz, The Corporation Tax, 5 J. PuB. ECON. 303
(1976).
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by examining its application to the treatment of corporate distributions to
shareholders: A) in complete liquidation of the corporation, including
discussion of problems created by the sale of stock and presentation of
an alternative provision to replace present Code section 331 (a)(l); B) in
redemption with an analysis of bootstrap acquisitions; C) in partial
liquidation; D) which except for the absence of earnings and profits
would be treated as dividends; E) in complete liquidation under Code
section 333; F) which are now governed by Code section 341; and G)
which constitute boot received in connection with an otherwise tax-free
reorganization. Third, this article examines the need for allocation of
contributed capital among shareholders caused by different issue prices
of stock within the same class, convertible stock, reorganizations, and
sections 305 and 306. Moreover, different methods for effecting such
allocations are discussed. Finally, potential tax avoidance difficulties
which adoption of this proposal may create are considered and possible
solutions explored.
I. THE FULLY QUALIFIED CORPORATION
The proposed test for determining whether a corporation is a Fully
Qualified Corporation is based on the ratio of lifetime dividend
payments of a corporation over the capital contributed by its
shareholders. Payment of dividends as defined in section 316 results in
the inclusion in the gross income of non-corporate shareholders the
amount of such dividends.' 6 A corporate distribution can only be a
dividend, as opposed to a return of capital or gain in excess of return of
capital, if the corporation has sufficient earnings and profits. Cor-
porate earnings and profits bear a fixed relationship to the corpora-
tion's taxable income and to its earned surplus, and each item can be
derived from the other.' 7 The existence of earnings and profits norm-
ally will indicate that a corporation has earned profits which have been
subjected to the corporate tax. Thus, the payment by a corporation of
dividends is a cornerstone of the double tax system, and the amount of
16. I.R.C. § 316(a) defines "dividend" as
any distribution of property made by a corporation to its shareholders -
(1) out of its earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, or
(2) out of its earnings and profits of the taxable year (computed as of the close of
the taxable year without diminution by reason of any distributions made during the
taxable year), without regard to the amount of the earnings and profits at the time
the distribution was made.
I.R.C. § 301(c)(1) states that "that portion of the distribution which is a dividend (as defined in §
316) shall be included in gross income." I.R.C. § 301(b)(l)(A) states that the amount of a
distribution to a non-corporate distributee is "the amount of money received, plus the fair market
value of the other property received."
17. B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS § 7.03 (3d ed. 1971).
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dividends paid will constitute a handy tool for measuring the extent to
which a corporation and its shareholders have submitted to the double
taxation of corporate gain or have avoided it."
What ratio of lifetime corporate dividend payments to the excess in
value of such corporation's assets over the capital contributed by its
shareholders (such excess in value being sometimes hereinafter referred
to as "net asset value"), should make a corporation Fully Qualified
(one whose shareholders are entitled to capital gains treatment on cor-
porate distributions)? A satisfactory ratio should be one which is
attainable by a continuing corporation upon its liquidation.9
While not conclusive, the ratio of dividend payments to net earnings
under present law suggests that an average corporation could be ex-
pected to pay out fifty per cent of its net earnings in dividends.20 Since
present law favors the distribution of a corporation's assets to its
shareholders as other than a dividend,2' it seems probable that an even
higher percentage of an average corporation's net earnings directly
benefits its shareholders. Nevertheless, to illustrate this article's pro-
posal, a one-to-one ratio of dividends to net asset value will be required
of a Fully Qualifying Corporation.22 Thus, a Fully Qualified Corpora-
18. The fact that a shareholder is not required to include in gross income his or her pro rata
share of retained corporate earnings constitutes a substantial economic benefit to shareholders.
In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the Supreme Court rejected the contention that
under the sixteenth amendment a shareholder should be taxed on his share of retained corporate
earnings. To date, Congress has not attempted to institute such a system.
Appreciation in asset value goes untaxed at the corporate level until a taxable event occurs
which is of assistance to corporations since it prevents capital needed in the business from being
diverted to the payment of taxes on appreciation which has not been translated into money or its
equivalent. Accordingly, the growth corporation which profits from the deferral of tax on asset
appreciation, and whose shareholders profit from the deferral of taxation on undistributed earn-
ings, should pay its dues while it continues to exist by paying out dividends if it wishes preferential
treatment upon liquidation. Other corporations may not pay out dividends because no profits are
made and no net appreciation in asset value occurs. Such corporations will be unconcerned with
the need to earn preferential treatment for their liquidating distribution since they should not
realize gain on liquidation. In between is the corporation which defers paying dividends for no
corporate business purpose, but only to shield its shareholders from dividend treatment of its
earned surplus. Such shareholders cannot complain that the earned capital gain concept for
redemptions or liquidations is inequitable, since they are merely being charged for previous
deferral.
19. See note 6 supra.
20. This ratio has fluctuated. According to one commentator, American industrial corpora-
tions normally have paid out between fifty to seventy per cent of net earnings as dividends. G. L.
LEFFIiER, THE STOCK MARKET at 26 (1963). The average dividend payout as a percentage of profit
for all American companies for each of the years from 1956 through 1960 was respectively 52%,
56%, 6507o, and from 1940 through 1954 averaged 4507o. H. E. DOUGALL & H. G. GUTHMANN,
CORPORATE FINANCIAL PotLicy at 540 (1962).
21. See note 13 supra.
22. In the discussion which follows in Section 11, the reader should keep in mind that a higher
required ratio of dividends to net asset value would result in a greater lifetime tax burden to a
lifetime shareholder of a liquidating corporation, and that a lower required ratio would result in a
[Vol. 13:1
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tion shall refer to a corporation whose lifetime dividend payments equal
its net asset value.
II. CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS
A. Complete Liquidation
The proposed treatment of corporate distributions in part or full pay-
ment in exchange for stock of its shareholders will be developed first by
considering the treatment of distributions in complete liquidation of a
corporation. Four types of corporations might be involved with a com-
plete liquidation under the corporate dividend ratio to net asset value
test. The corporation might be: (1) a Fully Qualified Corporation
(lifetime dividend payments equal or exceed the corporation's net asset
value), (2) a corporation which has not paid sufficient dividends to be
Fully Qualified, but has enough earnings and profits to make up the
deficit in dividend payments, (3) a corporation which is neither Fully
Qualified nor possessed of sufficient earnings and profits to recoup the
deficit in dividend payments but has paid or could pay some dividends,
or (4) a corporation which is not Fully Qualified, has no earnings and
profits and has paid no dividends.
The treatment of shareholders of each of these corporations
(hereinafter referred to as category 1, 2, 3, or 4 Corporations respec-
tively) can be understood best by considering a few concrete examples.
EXAMPLE 1: A contrast between Corporation A (category 1) and
Corporation B (category 2) is instructive. Assume that both have been
in existence and actively operated for twenty years. Since their respec-
tive incorporations, all of the outstanding stock of Corporations A and
B has been owned by the original incorporator.
Corporation A was formed by its sole shareholder A-1 for an original
capital contribution of $10,000. It has paid lifetime dividends in the
amount of $100,000, and has a fair market value for its assets of
$110,000. Thus, Corporation A has a net asset value (fair market value
of $110,000 less contributed capital of $10,000) of $100,000. Since the
lifetime dividends paid by Corporation A equal its net asset value, it is
Fully Qualified. Corporation A adopts a plan of complete liquidation,
sells its assets and then distributes to A-1 in exchange for his stock the
sum of $110,000. Under present section 331, A-1 would be entitled to
treat his gain of $100,000 as a capital gain. 23 Under the proposed treat-
ment of liquidations, A-1 will also be entitled to treat his gain of
$100,000 as a capital gain since Corporation A is a Fully Qualified Cor-
lower lifetime tax burden to a lifetime shareholder of a liquidating corporation. The effect of
using any ratio is discussed in Section 11 infra.
23. See note 6 and note 13 supra.
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poration.
Like Corporation A, Corporation B was formed by its sole
shareholder B-1 for an original capital contribution of $10,000; unlike
Corporation A, Corporation B has paid no dividends, though it has
earnings and profits of $200,000. Corporation B has a fair market
value for its assets of $210,000 and thus a net asset value of $200,000.
Corporation B adopts a plan of complete liquidation, sells its assets and
then distributes to B-1 in exchange for her stock the sum of $210,000.
Under present section 331, B-1 would be entitled to treat her gain of
$200,000 as a capital gain.
The disparity in the treatment of A-1 and B-1 is evident. Assume
that A-1 and B-I for all years in question would have been taxed on any
income from Corporation A or Corporation B, respectively at the
marginal rate of seventy per cent.2" Corporation A had a lifetime net
asset value of $200,000, half of which was distributed to A-1 as a divi-
dend and half of which was the gain recognized by A-I upon the
liquidation of Corporation A. Under present law, A-I paid taxes in the
amount of $70,000 for the dividends received and $35,000 (capital gains
treatment) for the liquidating distribution." Corporation B had a
lifetime net asset value of $200,000, all of which was recognized by B-I
upon the liquidation of Corporation B. Under present law, B-1 paid
taxes in the amount of $70,000 on the liquidating distribution. Though
Corporation A and Corporation B had the same lifetime net asset value,
A-1 has paid taxes in the amount of $105,000, while B-1 has paid taxes
in the amount of $70,000. Thus, present law has enabled Corporation
B to manipulate its affairs in a manner which greatly reduces the double
tax burden for Corporation B and for its shareholder B-i; whereas,
Corporation A has been penalized for its submission to the double tax
system.
Under the proposed system, Corporation B is not a Fully Qualified
Corporation, but has sufficient earnings and profits to pay a qualifying
dividend. Thus, under the proposed system, Corporation B would
have to pay out $100,000 in dividends thereby decreasing its net asset
value to $100,000 in order to become a Fully Qualified Corporation.
The gain of $100,000 on the subsequent liquidating distribution would
then be entitled to capital gains treatment. Alternatively, B-I could be
required to treat $100,000 of the liquidating distribution as a dividend
with the remainder of the distribution being entitled to capital gains
treatment, and Corporation B would not be required to issue a formal
24. Seventy per cent is the top tax rate provided by I.R.C. § I and all examples in this article
assume that the individual affected takes a given item into gross income at that marginal rate. For
ease of illustration all computations in this article are made without taking into account the
minimum tax provisions of I.R.C. §§ 56-58, the maximum tax provisions of I.R.C. § 1348, or the
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dividend. It is debatable whether to require a corporation to pay out
qualifying dividends or to treat automatically an appropriate portion of
the liquidating distribution as a dividend up to the amount of the cor-
poration's earnings and profits. Essentially, however, this question is
secondary to a consideration of the main proposal. Therefore, it is
hereinafter assumed that a corporation has paid out the maximum
dividends which its earnings and profits would allow, up to the amount
needed to become Fully Qualified.
EXAMPLE 2: Consider now Corporation D (category 4). Assume
Corporation D has been in existence for one year and was formed by its
sole shareholder D-1 for an original capital contribution of $10,000.
Corporation D used the contributed capital to make a motion picture
which upon its. completion is determined to have a fair market value of
$210,000, having a basis to the corporation of $10,000.25 Assuming
Coporation D is a collapsible corporation, if it adopts a plan of com-
plete liquidation and distributes the motion picture to D-1 in exchange
for her stock, then D-1 will be required to treat her gain of $200,000 as
gain from the sale or exchange of property which is not a capital asset.
Under the proposed treatment of complete liquidations, Corporation D
is not a Fully Qualified Corporation since it has paid no dividends, and
has no earnings and profits out of which to pay them. Accordingly,
D-I is not entitled to preferential treatment on her liquidating gain of
$200,000 under the proposal. Corporation D would be able to become
a Fully Qualified Corporation if it sold the motion picture before
adopting a plan of complete liquidation since it would then have earn-
ings and profits out of which to pay qualifying dividends. Of course,
Corporation D would be subject to corporate tax on the gain realized
on the sale of its sole asset.26 Whether under the proposed treatment of
liquidating distributions it would be preferable for a collapsible cor-
poration to become a Fully Qualified Corporation or merely to
distribute its assets after adoption of a plan of complete liquidation will
depend on the rate at which the corporation's sale of its assets would be
twenty-five per cen( tax ceiling of 1.R.C. § 1201(b).
25. I.R.C. §1012 provides that the basis of property is its cost.
26. To illustrate this point, assume that Corporation D sells the movie with the $200,000 gain
being taxed at the rate of 307o. Half of the after tax earnings of $140,000 are distributed to D-I as
a dividend which results in D-I being a Fully Qualified Corporation because total dividends
($70,000) equal corporate net asset value (fair market value of remaining assets less contributed
capital). The remaining $80,000 is distributed to D-I in exchange for her stock, resulting in a
$70,000 capital gain. Assuming D-I is taxed at the rate of 70%, see note 24 supra, the taxes paid
on such transactions are $60,000 in corporate tax, $49,000 tax to D-I on the dividend received, and
$24,500 tax to D-1 on her gain on the liquidating distribution. Total taxes paid by D and D-I
would thus be $133,500, a slight savings over the $140,000 in tax to D-I which would result under
the proposal if Corporation D had merely distributed the motion picture to D-1 in complete
liquidation. Such result is not objectionable since it is a consequence of D and D- I submitting cor-
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taxed and the rate at which shareholders will be taxed on receipt of a
dividend or liquidating distribution.
EXAMPLE 3: The final situation is that of a category 3 corporation.
Assume Corporation C was formed by its sole shareholder C-I for an
original capital contribution of $10,000, and that C-I has remained the
only shareholder of the corporation during its ten year existence. Cor-
poration C owns real property which has greatly appreciated in value.
The corporation has operated a drive-in movie theater on the property
with the expectation of selling such property for development when
growth of the community made it profitable. Corporation C has paid
lifetime dividends of $50,000, has no earnings and profits, and has a
fair market value for its assets of $160,000. Thus, Corporation C has a
net asset value of $150,000, and is not a Fully Qualifying Corporation
because its dividends paid and payable (zero dividends are payable
without earnings and profits) do not equal or exceed its net asset value.
Under present law, if Corporation C adopts a plan of complete
liquidation, sells its assets, and then distributes to C-i in exchange for
his stock the sale proceeds of $160,000, C-I will be entitled to treat his
gain of $150,000 as a capital gain. Under the proposal, C-1 will not be
entitled to treat his gain of $150,000 as a capital gain. Unlike Corpora-
tions A and B, Corporation C has not earned such preferential treat-
ment for its shareholder C-I because it has not submitted its apprecia-
tion in asset value to double taxation. However, unlike Corporation D,
Corporation C has submitted to the double tax system to some extent as
its dividend payments indicate, and it would be inequitable to deny C-I
credit for such dividend payments. Therefore, C-i should be entitled to
treat $50,000 of his liquidating gain as capital gain since such is the
amount of Corporation C's dividend payments.27 The remaining gain
of $100,000 should be treated as gain from the sale or exchange of a
non-capital asset. Thus, assuming C-I will be taxed at a rate of seventy
per cent, the proposed treatment would result in a tax to C-I upon his
liquidating gain of $87,500; whereas, present law would result in a tax
of $52,500.
If the proposed treatment discussed in Examples 1, 2, and 3 were
adopted, then the following picture of the resulting corporate-
shareholder tax system would emerge. The continuing corporation
which submits to the double tax system would be favored over the cor-
poration which liquidates without permitting double taxation of cor-
porate appreciation in value. To accomplish this favoritism of the con-
porate gain to the double tax burden.
27. If the ratio of dividends to net asset value required of a Fully Qualified Corporation was
made less than one-to-one, then the credit for dividends paid would decrease. Likewise, if the
ratio was made greater than one-to-one, the credit would increase.
[Vol. 13:1
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tinuing corporation, a shareholder will be entitled to capital gains treat-
ment of his or her gain on liquidation only to the extent of such
shareholder's pro rata share of the lifetime dividends paid by the cor-
poration, with any excess of such liquidating gain being considered as
gain from the sale of a non-capital asset.
1. Problems Created by Sale of Stock
The key to the proposed system is the government's expectancy that
liquidating gains will be treated as gain from the sale of a non-capital
asset, or as ordinary income, to the extent such liquidating gains are un-
matched by dividends paid by the corporation during its lifetime
(or by such shareholder's pro rata share in the case of multiple
shareholders).28 Thus far, this article has considered the treatment
upon liquidation of a shareholder who was the original incorporator of
his or her corporation, and who has owned all of the shares since incor-
poration. In such original owner cases, the government anticipates that
the corporation's lifetime appreciation in value will result in ordinary
income treatment of liquidating gains to the extent not matched by
dividends, with liquidating gains meaning the excess in value of
liquidating distribution over the corporation's contributed capital or
the original shareholder's basis for his or her shares.29 In other words,
the shareholder's basis in his or her stock and the capital contributed
for such stock are identical. This is not so once the original owner has
sold or otherwise disposed of his or her shares. Under existing law,
originally contributed capital is the measure of gain upon liquidation
only if the original shareholders have not sold their shares for an
amount other than the original capital contributed for them.3" In the
present system of corporate shareholder-taxation, there is no relation
between the cost basis for stock and the original capital contributed for
that stock."
It is important to recognize that a purchaser of stock does not invest
28. See discussion of Fu-t -yQUALIFItt) C(ORI'O(RATION. Section I supra.
29. Id.
30. I.R.C. § 1001 provides that "the gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall
be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis" of such property. I.R.C.
§ 1012 provides that, with certain exceptions, "the basis of property shall be the cost of such pro-
perty.' Thus, if a sale has occurred for an amount other than the original capital contributed for
such share, the resulting cost basis will be used to measure gain upon liquidation. See also note 13
supra for discussion of the operation of I.R.C. § 331 which governs liquidations.
31. Hereinafter the original capital contribution attributable to a given share of stock shall
sometimes be referred to as the "capital component" of such share, and the cost to a given pur-
chaser of his shares shall be referred to as such shareholder's basis in such shares. Thus, if an
original incorporator received one share of the stock of X Corporation for a contribution to its
capital of $500 and later sold such share of stock to Y for S1,000, then such share of stock would
have a capital component of $500 and a basis to Y of $1,000.
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money directly in the issuer, but rather buys the investment represented
by the stock purchased. A sale of shares by an original incorporator
represents a realization by the selling shareholder of his or her portion
of the increase in value of the corporation's underlying assets resulting
from the retention or increase in value of property in excess of the
original capital contributed for his or her shares. Though share price
may reflect anticipated future earning power or items other than true
asset value, 2 such difference presumably evaporates at the point of
business cessation. Thus, sales of shares are but a stage in the ultimate
liquidation of the enterprise which, in effect, enables the seller to
liquidate his or her investment, under present law as capital gain, before
the corporation is itself liquidated.
In considering the problem caused by the sale of stock, let us again
refer to Corporation C which was formed by C-I for an original capital
contribution of $10,000. It has been in existence for ten years, has paid
lifetime dividends of $50,000, has no earnings and profits, and has a
fair market value of $160,000. Following the proposed scheme, 3 if
Corporation C adopts a plan of complete liquidation, sells its assets and
distributes the sale proceeds of $160,000 to C-I, then C-1 will treat
$50,000 of his gain as capital gain and $100,000 as ordinary gain from
the sale of a non-capital asset. Suppose C-1 sold all of his shares to C-2
for $100,000 five years after the incorporation of Corporation C. C-2
operates Corporation C for five years and then elects to adopt a plan of
complete liquidation, sell the assets of Corporation C and distribute the
sale proceeds of $160,000 in exchange for the stock of C-2. What is the
amount of gain realized by C-1 on his sale of stock and C-2 on her
liquidating distribution and how are such gains to be treated?
Assume that C-1 and C-2 will be taxed on all income at the rate of
seventy per cent. If C-I had retained the ownership of his stock and
liquidated the corporation, then upon liquidation, his gain of $150,000
would have been treated as capital gain to the extent of the lifetime divi-
dend payments of Corporation C ($50,000), yielding a tax of $17,500,
and as ordinary gain for the portion of total gain unmatched by
dividends ($100,000), yielding a tax of $70,000, for a total tax of
$87,500. What is the result when C-1 has sold to C-2 for $100,000 as
outlined in the immediately preceding paragraph? If we allow capital
gains treatment of the sale of shares, then C-1 pays a tax of $31,500 on
his capital gain from the sale of his stock. If we allow earned capital
gains treatment to C-2, then C-2 has a liquidating gain of $60,000 which
is capital gain to the extent of the $50,000 of dividends paid, yielding a
32. See generally G. D. MCCARTHY& R. E. HEALY. VALUING A COMPANY (1971).
33. See discussion of FULLt QUALIFIED CORPORATION, Section I supra.
[Vol. 13:1
1977] CORPORATE DISTRIBUTION AND SHAREHOLDER GAIN 101
tax of $17,500, and is ordinary gain to the extent of $10,000, yielding a
tax of $7,000. Thus, the total tax received by the government from C-1
upon liquidation in the first case is $87,500; while, in the second case
the government would receive from C-1 and C-2 only $56,000 in tax. As
a result, the government's expectancy that one-half of lifetime cor-
porate appreciation will be paid out as dividends, and that to the extent
of a short-fall in such dividend payments liquidating gains will be
treated as ordinary gain,"4 will be defeated by a sale of shares unless a
change is made in the proposal to account for such possibility.
There are two possible ways to modify the earned capital gains con-
cept to handle the problem caused by the sale of shares. One is to test
each sale of a share for its qualification for capital gains treatment. The
other is to burden the holder of shares when liquidation occurs with an
additional tax based on the tax revenue lost by the government as a
result of the automatic capital gains treatment afforded the various
sellers of shares.
The first possibility is that instead of allowing capital gains on all
sales of shares with a reckoning for the consequences of insufficient
dividend payment only upon liquidation, a seller of shares should be en-
titled to capital gains treatment only if and to the extent that the divi-
dend payments of the issuer to the date of sale entitle him under the
earned capital gains approach. Thus, if at the time of C-l's sale of his
stock to C-2 for $100,000, Corporation C had paid $25,000 in
dividends, then the gain of $90,000 recognized by C-1 would be treated
as a capital gain to the extent of $25,000 and as ordinary gain to the
extent of $65,000.
At least six objections can be made to treating sales of shares in this
manner: (1) it would create a bias against earnings retention which
might be inconsistent with the capital needs of the economy; (2) it
would make it more difficult for growth companies to raise equity
capital; (3) no corporate assets actually leave corporate solution on a
sale of shares; (4) such treatment would discriminate against purchasers
of stock who sell out at times of dividend deficiencies which are later
eradicated; (5) many more sales occur than do liquidations and each of
these sales would become a matter of complexity; (6) the corporation
would be required to make complicated adjustments to its bookkeeping
to keep track of the dividend account.
The second possibility is to allow capital gains treatment of all shares
in a going enterprise with a reckoning for the consequences of insuffi-
cient dividend payment only upon liquidation. Under such an
approach, the purchaser of shares in a non-Fully Qualified Corporation
34. Id.
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would be thought of as having assumed the tax liabilities owed by the
previous owners of such shares, if any, or as having purchased his or
her shares subject to a contingent tax liability. Upon the sale of C-i's
stock, the government allowed C-1 to treat his gain of $90,000 as a
capital gain even though the corporation had not paid dividends in such
amount. At liquidation, Corporation C has paid dividends of $50,000,
which means that $40,000 of C-i's gain was treated as capital gain
rather than the ordinary gain to which the government was entitled
under the proposed scheme. To give the treasury the tax which it is due
and to make the earned capital gains concept work, C-2 must recognize
an imputed ordinary gain sufficient to produce the tax which has other-
wise been lost because of (a) the capital gains treatment afforded C-1 on
his sale of stock, and (b) the failure of Corporation C to pay dividends
sufficient to become a Fully Qualified Corporation. C-I paid a capital
gains tax of $14,000 on the $40,000 of gain not ultimately matched by
corporate dividend payments. This gain should have been taxed as
ordinary income yielding $28,000 in tax. This tax may be recouped
upon liquidation by requiring C-2 to pay a tax of $14,000, the actual
amount of the contingent tax liability which she assumed or took sub-
ject to upon her purchase from C-I. Thus, C-2 upon liquidation will be
required to report as an imputed ordinary gain the sum of $20,000. The
dividends of Corporation C are exhausted by application against the
gain of C-i, leaving no dividends to match against C-2's liquidating
gain of $60,000 which is treated, therefore, as ordinary gain. The result
is a tax to C-2 of $14,000 on the imputed ordinary gain (the contingent
tax liability of C-1 which C-2 is deemed to have assumed or taken sub-
ject to) and a tax to C-2 of $42,000 on her liquidating gain. When C-2's
total tax of $56,000 is added to the $31,500 in tax paid by C-1 for his
gain upon the sale of his shares, the total tax recovered by the govern-
ment from liquidating and quasi-liquidating (sales of shares) distribu-
tions is $87,500, the same amount of tax as the government would have
recovered if C-1 had remained the owner of Corporation C until its
liquidation.
Obviously, in any given corporation, the government will not receive
the same amount of lifetime tax from shareholder gain when sales of
stock occur as it would receive if there were no sales, unless the tax rates
are identical for all shareholders at all times. Nonetheless, looking at
all liquidations, the rates should average out so that the total receipts by
the government should be roughly the same under the modified pro-
posal whether sales of shares occur or not. Additionally, the proposed
imputation of ordinary gain in an amount equal to one-half of the prior
capital gains unmatched by dividends at liquidation is slightly unfair to
corporate shareholders since they receive less than a fifty per cent
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capital gains preference. This, however, would constitute simply
another factor in corporate share purchase decisions.
Each purchaser of shares will be interested in the dividend payments
of a given corporation and the capital component of the shares which
he or she contemplates buying. A purchaser would take his or her
shares with a contingent imputed ordinary gain having a maximum
amount equal to one-half of the amount by which the excess of the pur-
chase price paid for his or her shares (the purchaser's basis) over the
capital component of such shares exceeded the share of corporate divi-
dend payments attributable to such shares. Thus, when C-2 purchased
C-i's shares for $100,000, the purchase price exceeded the capital com-
ponent of such shares by $90,000, and there was only $25,000 in divi-
dend payments, giving C-2 a contingent imputed ordinary gain in the
maximum amount (if no further corporate dividends were paid) of
$75,000. It will be a simple matter for a non-Fully Qualified Corpora-
tion to make available for dissemination to potential market investors
the capital component of its share and the dividends paid which are
attributable to a share. This proposal leaves to each purchaser of
shares the task of evaluating the risk of liquidation, the corporation's
past dividend history and its future prospects. Presumably, the pur-
chaser of shares will be willing to pay less to the extent of the risk of
liquidation. Thus, the owner of shares in a non-Fully Qualified Cor-
poration will be unable to enrich himself or herself unjustly. It seems
more consistent with the purpose of the earned capital gains treatment
proposal of favoring continuing corporations that sellers of shares be
allowed capital gains treatment regardless of the corporation's dividend
payment status at that time, with the accounting for dividend deficien-
cies postponed until liquidation. This allows a corporation to structure
its dividend payouts as its business needs require and does not penalize
shareholders who sell out at periods when an ultimately Fully Qualified
Corporation is dividend deficient. Therefore, further references in this
article to the treatment of liquidations will assume that such approach
has been adopted, rather than the approach testing each sale of shares.
Thus far, the analysis has considered the application of the earned
capital gains concept in the case of liquidations where: (1) the
shareholder's basis for stock to be surrendered equalled the capital
component of such shares and (2) the value of the liquidating distribu-
tion exceeds the shareholder's basis for stock to be surrendered and (3)
the basis exceeds the capital component of such shares. There are two
other possible situations. The first is where a shareholder's basis for his
or her shares exceeds both value of the liquidating distribution and the
capital component of such shares. The second is where the capital com-
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ponent of shares exceeds its basis.
EXAMPLE 1: Assume that C-2 purchased the stock owned by C-I
for $100,000, that Corporation C paid out lifetime dividends of
$50,000, but unlike the earlier case, Corporation C upon its liquidation
has a fair market value of $90,000. As in all previous examples, C-i
and C-2 are taxed at the rate of seventy per cent. If C-i had retained
the ownership of his shares, then, upon receipt of a liquidating distribu-
tion of $90,000, his gain of $80,000 would under the earned capital
gains formula be treated as a $50,000 capital gain and a $30,000
ordinary gain, yielding a total tax of $38,500. To insure equivalent tax
burdens regardless of the sale of shares, C-2 will be treated as follows:
C-2 will receive a capital loss of $10,000, representing the difference
between her basis and the value of the liquidating distribution, a poten-
tial tax benefit of $3,500; C-2 will recognize an imputed ordinary gain
of $15,000, representing one-half of the excess of the difference
between the value of the liquidating distribution and the capital com-
ponent of surrendered shares, over the lifetime dividend payments of
the corporation, a tax cost to C-2 of $10,500. Thus, the net tax cost to
C-2 is $7,000 which when added to the total $31,500 of capital gains tax
paid by C-I on his gain of $90,000 from the sale of his shares results in a
total tax yield to the government of $38,500, the same amount as would
have resulted had C-I remained the owner of his shares until the
liquidation of Corporation C.
EXAMPLE 2: There may be cases where a shareholder will purchase
shares for less than its capital component. Suppose C-2 purchased the
shares of C-I for $5,000 one year after the formation of Corporation C,
at which time no dividends had been paid and Corporation C was worth
only $5,000. C-1 obtained a capital loss on the sale of his stock, a
potential tax benefit of $1,750.
If Corporation C were ultimately liquidated having a fair market
value of $2,500, then C-2 would suffer a capital loss of $2,500, a poten-
tial tax benefit of $875. The total potential tax benefit derived from
Corporation C would thus be the same whether or not C-1 had sold his
shares. If instead, Corporation C is liquidated after the payment of
$50,000 in lifetime dividends and at a time when its fair market value is
$160,000, then the following treatment of C-2's gain of $155,000 will
result: C-2 will receive a capital gain of $5,000 representing the dif-
ference between her basis and the capital component of her shares,
yielding a tax of $1,750 (and off-setting the tax benefit afforded to C-1
on the capital loss resulting from the sale to C-2); C-2 will receive a
capital gain of $50,000 (amount equal to dividend payments) yielding a
tax of $17,500; the remaining gain will be treated as ordinary gain
yielding a tax of $70,000. This brings the same total tax yield to the
[Vol. 13:1
1977] CORPORATE DISTRIBUTION AND SHAREHOLDER GAIN 105
government as would have resulted had C-I retained his shares rather
than selling out to C-2.
2. Proposed Section in Lieu of Section 331(a)(1)
The preceding examples have demonstrated the application of the
earned capital gains concept to liquidating distributions. Without at
this point attempting to define further the concepts developed above,
consider how such a provision might look upon its codification. The
following proposed section would be substituted for present section
331(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code:
(1) COMPLETE LIQUIDATIONS -
(A) Upon the receipt of a distribution in complete liquidation of
a corporation, the recipient shall recognize an imputed ordinary
gain equal to one-half of the amount, if any, by which the lifetime
dividend payments attributable to his shares surrendered in such
complete liquidation are exceeded by the difference, but not less
than zero, obtained by subtracting the capital component of such
surrendered shares from the lesser of the shareholder's basis for
such surrendered shares or the fair market value of the liquidating
distributions.
(B) If amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a corpora-
tion are exceeded by the surrendering shareholder's basis for the
stock for which such distributions are made, such deficit shall be
treated as loss from the sale of a capital asset. If amounts
distributed in complete liquidation of a corporation are in excess of
the surrendering shareholder's basis for the stock for which such
distributions are made, and if the capital component of the sur-
rendered shares exceeds the shareholder's basis for such shares,
then such portion of the excess of the value of the liquidating
distribution over the shareholder's basis as does not exceed the ex-
cess of the capital component of the surrendered shares over the
shareholder's basis for such shares shall be treated as gain from the
sale of a capital asset. If amounts distributed in complete
liquidation of a corporation are in excess of the surrendering
shareholder's basis for the stock for which such distributions are
made, then the excess of the value of the liquidating distribution
over the greater of the capital component of such shares or the
shareholder's basis therefor shall be treated as gain from the sale of
a capital asset to the extent such excess does not exceed the dif-
ference obtained by subtracting from the lifetime corporate divi-
dend payments attributable to such share, the amount, if any, by
which the basis of the surrendered shares exceeds the capital com-
ponent thereof. If after application of the immediately preceding
two sentences, there remains untreated as capital gain any portion
of the excess of the amounts distributed in complete liquidation of
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a corporation over the shareholder's basis for the shares sur-
rendered, then such remaining gain shall be treated as gain from the
sale of a non-capital asset.
3. Effect of Proposal on Tax Burdens
As a final point, it might be helpful to consider the tax burden
resulting in various situations under the proposal by examining the
following tables. The Tables deal with a corporation which is an
amalgamation of the various corporations which we have examined in
this section. The corporation involved was formed by its original in-
corporator A-I for a capital contribution of $10,000. Table I shows the
tax consequences to A-1 upon liquidation under various corporate divi-
dend histories, which dividend payments are presumed to exhaust the
earnings and profits of the corporation. Table II shows the treatment
of A-2 upon liquidation, where A-2 has purchased all of A-l's shares
for $60,000. Notice that under the proposed treatment the total
lifetime tax burden (tax on dividends, gains on sales of shares and
liquidation) is greatest when the corporation has paid no dividends and
decreases as dividends are paid. In contrast, under present law, the
total lifetime tax burden is least when no dividends have been paid, and
increases as dividends are paid. Thus, the proposal rewards submittal
to the double tax system where present law penalizes such action. Note
that columns one and three of Table I should be read as part of Table II
as well.
TABLE I
2 3 4 5 6 7
Tax to A-I on
F.MV. of Lifetime Tax on Tax to A-I on Liquid. Gain TotalTa Total Tax
Liquidating Dividends Paid Dividends Liquid. Gain Under Burden Under Burden Under
Distribution or Payable (@ 7 007o) Under Proposal Present Law Proposal Present Law
110,000 100,000 70,000 35,000 35,000 105,000 105,000
120,000 90,000 63,000 45,000 38,500 108,000 101,500
130,000 80,000 56,000 56,000 42,000 112,000 98,000
140,000 70,000 49,000 66,500 45,500 115,500 94,500
150,000 60,000 42,000 77,000 49,000 119,000 91,000
160,000 50,000 35,000 87,000 52,500 122,500 87,500
170,000 40,000 28,000 98,000 56,000 126,000 84,000
180,000 30,000 21,000 108,500 59,500 129,500 80,500
190,000 20,000 14,000 119,000 63,000 133,000 77,000
200,000 10,000 7,000 129,500 66,500 136,500 73,500
210,000 -0- -0- 140,000 70,000 140,000 70,000
(3 + 4)
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TABLE II
8 9 10 11 12 13
Tax to A-2 Tax to A-2 Tax to A-2
Tax to A-I on Imputed on Liquidat- Upon Liquid. tI otal Tax total Iax
on Sale of Ordinary Gain ing Gain Under Burden Under Burden LUndcr
Shares to A-2 Under Proposal Under Proposal Present La. Proposal Preent I a,,
17,500 -0- 17,500 17,500 105,000 105,000
17,500 -0- 28,000 21,000 108,500 101,500
17,500 -0- 38,500 24,500 112,000 98,000
17,500 -0- 49,000 28,000 115,500 94,500
17,500 -0- 59,500 31,500 119,000 91,000
17,500 -0- 70,000 35,000 122,500 87,500
17,500 3,500 77,000 38,500 126,000 84,000
17,500 7,000 84,000 42,000 129,500 80,500
17,500 10,500 91,000 45,500 133,000 77,000
17,500 14,000 98,000 49,000 136,500 73,500
17,500 17,500 105,000 52,500 140,000 70,000
(3 + 8 - 9 + 10) (3 + 8 + II)
B. Corporate Distributions in Redemption
The model for treatment of complete liquidations suggests that gain
on redemptions" should be entitled to capital gains treatment only to a
limited extent. It should be entitled to such treatment when the cor-
poration's dividend history would result in capital gains treatment if a
complete liquidation were carried out on the date of such redemption,
with the excess gain being treated as ordinary income.
As long as sales of shares to third parties are entitled to capital gains
treatment, how does one justify denying such treatment to a
shareholder who has part or all of his or her shares purchased by the
issuing corporation? As discussed earlier,36 treatment of the gain (pur-
chase price minus basis) realized by a seller of shares as automatically
entitled to capital gain treatment is preferable to requiring that the gain
from such sale be entitled to capital gains tax treatment only to the ex-
tent that the corporation's dividend history would qualify distributions
in complete liquidation occurring on the same date. However, a
redemption is much more akin to the final reckoning which takes place
upon complete liquidation than it is to a sale of shares to outsiders.37
35. I.R.C. § 317(b) defines a redemption as follows: "stock shall be treated as redeemed by a
corporation if the corporation acquires its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property,
whether or not the stock so acquired is cancelled, retired or held as treasury stock."
36. See discussion in Section II(A)(l) supra.
37. In a redemption, corporate assets leave corporate solution while in a sale of shares they
do not. In a sale of shares, each purchaser is accountable to the government for any existing or
future deficiencies in the corporation's dividend account, while in a redemption, no one will ever
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It has been argued that denying capital gains treatment to sellers of
shares in non-Fully Qualifying Corporations would be both a deterrent
to the ability of growth companies to raise equity capital and an
unhealthy inducement to management to pay out as dividends earnings
needed in the business.38 Neither of these concerns would be present in
the case of redemption which represents an attempt by management to
reduce capital. The use of the earned capital gains treatment concept
will create no information dispersal or administrative difficulty in the
case of a Fully Qualified Corporation39 since it will be unnecessary to
inform a prospective redeemed shareholder of the status of the corpora-
tion's dividend account. Redemptions by less than Fully Qualified Cor-
porations would have to be preceded by transmitting to persons whose
shares the corporation wishes to redeem, information concerning the in-
come tax consequences of tendering such shares for redemption." °
Because redemptions by Non-Fully Qualified Corporations would
result in a greater tax to the seller of shares than would result from sales
to outsiders, Non-Fully Qualified Corporations wishing to redeem
shares probably would have to pay a premium over the market value of
their shares to induce shareholders to tender shares for redemption.
This loss of opportunity to redeem shares freely in the market would
not seem an unfair burden to place on such non-Fully Qualified
Corporations.
To the extent that a corporation does redeem shares, an appropriate
reduction in the corporation's dividend account would be required to
prevent unwarranted benefit by the remaining shareholders from such
redemption. Without a reduction, a corporation could become Fully
Qualified by a series of redemptions instead of making dividend
payments as contemplated by the earned capital gains concept.
Accordingly, each redemption should result in the dividend account of
the redeeming corporation being reduced by the product obtained by
multiplying the amount of the dividend account prior to the redemption
be called upon to account to the government for the tax lost on such distribution if the corp( ation
is eventually liquidated with an insufficient dividend account.
38. See discussion of methods to modify earned capital gains concepts, Section ll(A)(I)
supra.
39. In this context, a Fully Qualified Corportion is one which has paid out dividends which
on the date of the redemption equal the fair market value of the corporation minus the total
capital component of its outstanding shares.
40. A legislative by-product of instituting the proposed changes would almost certainly be a
requirement that publicly-traded companies provide information to a prospective redeemed
shareholder if a redemption would subject a redeemed shareholder to a greater tax burden than
would result from a sale of such shares to other than the corporation. Since a redemption by a
Fully Qualified Corporation would not bring a greater tax, no disclosure would be necessary.
However, a redemption by a less than Fully Qualified Corporation would result in a greater tax,
and advance disclosure of this fact would be necessary.
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by a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of shares redeemed
and the denominator of which is the number of shares outstanding prior
to the redemption. This formula will also prevent a corporation with
excess dividends paid from increasing the disproportion of such excess
to its fair market value as a result of a redemption.
The earned capital gains concept would work in the same manner for
redemptions as for complete liquidations."' Thus, it might be helpful to
review the various cases of complete liquidation examined earlier. 2 The
treatment of a redeemed shareholder under the earned capital gains
concept would be identical to that which resulted in those examples. As
a result, the statutory revision which would be required to implement
the proposal would be identical to that for a complete liquidation ex-
cept for: (a) reference to redemption instead of liquidation, and (b)
retention of the standards by which dividend equivalence are measured.
1. Bootstrap Acquisitions
The earned capital gains treatment of redemptions would be useful in
the type of bootstrap purchase situation typified by Zenz v. Quinlivan 3
where continuing corporations are now disfavored. In Zenz, a cor-
poration, the stock of which was wholly owned by one individual, had
substantial accumulated earnings and profits which were unneeded in
the business. In order that neither the buyer nor seller of the corpora-
tion's stock would be required to recognize these accumulated earnings
and profits as a dividend taxable as ordinary income, the sale transac-
tion was structured so that the buyer bought part of the seller's stock
for cash, and then a short time later, the corporation redeemed the
seller's remaining shares using up in the process most of the
accumulated earnings and profits. The seller treated the gain on such
redemption as capital gain."" The Internal Revenue Service argued that
41. Suppose Corporation E was formed in 1963 by two non-related individuals E-l and E-2,
each receiving 50 shares of common stock for a capital contribution of $5,000 each. In 1%7, E-2
sold his shares to E-3 for $50,000. In 1977, Corporation E then having paid out dividends in the
amount of $50,000, redeems E-3's shares for $80,000. E-3's pro rata share of lifetime corporate
dividend payments is $25,000. As with complete liquidations, E-3 purchased her shares subject to
a contingent imputed ordinary gain. Since E-2 received a capital gain on the sale to E-3 of
$45,000, and since E-3's share of lifetime dividends is only $25,000, E-3 is charged with an im-
puted ordinary gain in the amount of $10,000 (one-half of the amount by which the difference ob-
tained by subtracting the capital component of the redeemed shares from the lesser of such share's
basis or the value of the liquidating distribution, exceeds such share's pro rata share of lifetime
corporate dividend payments). E-3's gain on the redemption of $30,000 is treated as ordinary gain
since not matched by corporate dividend payments. As a result of such redemption, the dividend
account of Corporation E is reduced to $25,000.
42. See discussion of Complete Liquidation, Section II(A) supra.
43. 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).
44. Id. at 916.
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the proceeds of the redemption should be treated as a dividend since if
the prearranged redemption had preceded the sale of part of the shares
such would have been the result. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held in favor of the taxpayer. 5 The I.R.S. has announced that such a
transaction will be treated as meeting the requirements of Code section
302(b)(3).46
To appreciate how this article's proposal would affect the bootstrap
purchase situation, consider the following example. Assume that A is
the sole shareholder of corporation XYZ. A has a $10,000 basis and
capital component for her shares. XYZ has a book value of $400,000
allocated as follows: operating assets $100,000, and cash $300,000
($50,000 needed in the business). XYZ has earnings and profits of
$300,000. B has $250,000 to invest, and is willing to buy XYZ's
operating assets for $200,000 or to have A take down a $250,000 divi-
dend, and then sell her shares to B for $250,000. Instead, to come
within the Zenz sale followed by redemption formula, B buys fifty per
cent of A's shares for $250,000, and the corporation then redeems A's
remaining shares for $250,000. Under existing law, this transaction
would result in capital gains treatment for A's gain of $490,000. Under
the proposed treatment of redemptions, A still would obtain capital
gains treatment on her sale of shares; the redemption would be taxed to
A as a gain, the character of which under the earned capital gains con-
cept would be subject to the corporation's dividend history. If XYZ
has paid no dividends, then A will incur ordinary income treatment on
the redemption gain of $245,000, a result similar to the dividend treat-
ment which would have occurred if a $250,000 dividend had preceded
the purchase by B of the shares of A.
Under the proposed earned capital gains treatment of redemptions,
the purchaser will not be disinterested in the form of the purchase trans-
action. Since a purchaser of shares takes them subject to a contingent
imputed ordinary gain, the capital component of such shares and the
45. The court stated "[wle are satisfied that where the taxpayer effects a redemption which
completely extinguishes the taxpayer's interest in the corporation, and does not retain any
beneficial interest whatever, that such transaction is not the equivalent of the distribution of a tax-
able dividend to him." Id. at 917-18.
46. See Rev. Rul. 55-745. 1955-2 C.B. 223. The relevant parts of I.R.C. § 302 reads as follows:
(a). GCFNI-RAi RutI.. - It a corporation redeems its stock (within the meaning of, section
317(b)). and if paragraph (I), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (b) applies, such
redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for
the stock.
(b). RF )i i tiIt INs TRi-Ari) As Ex( t..\N.ES -
(3). TI RtiNATION 01 SHARI 1101 -r's INILRI St - Subsection (a) shall apply if the
redemption is in complete redemption of all the stock of the corporation owned
by the shareholder.
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dividend account of the issuer will be of substantial importance.
Assuming that XYZ has a zero dividend account, if B goes along with
the purchase-redemption scheme, B will own all of the outstanding
shares of XYZ having a capital component of $5,000 and XYZ will have
a zero dividend account; the redemption of A's remaining shares pro-
viding no addition to XYZ's dividend account since the payments to A
were not a dividend. B would thus take his stock subject to a con-
tingent imputed ordinary gain in the maximum amount of $245,000.
The proposed treatment of redemptions thus puts A and B in the same
position as if A and B had been the original incorporators of XYZ, con-
tributing for their shares $5,000 each. Unless XYZ has a $250,000 divi-
dend account, B will not be willing to pay $250,000 for the shares of A
in either the bootstrap purchase or retiring original incorporator situa-
tion, nor will B be willing to have XYZ redeem A's shares for $250,000.
The price B would be willing to pay or to have XYZ pay in redemption
would be subject to negotiation. However, assuming similar tax situa-
tions for A and B, it seems clear that B would require XYZ to have a
dividend account which makes it a Fully Qualified Corporation before
B would be willing to buy A's shares for $250,000.4 Thus, the pro-
posed earned capital gains treatment of redemptions should eliminate
the situations where a so-called bootstrap purchase has been thought to
constitute an unwarranted conversion of ordinary income into capital
gains.
C. Partial Liquidations
Partial liquidations would be handled in the same way as the pro-
posed treatment of complete liquidations or redemptions. A
47. The following table illustrates the transaction structure which likely would occur under
the proposed redemption treatment in three cases where B is the purchaser:
XYZ's Dividend Account
Prior To Transaction
$100,000 $490,000 $ 0
Fair Market Value of XYZ's
Assets Before Transaction 500,000 500,000 500,000
Dividend To A 197,000 0 245,000
Redemption of A's Shares
As Capital Gain 50,000 250,000 0
Purchase Price For Remainder
of A's Shares 255,000 250,000 255,000
Capital Component of B's Shares 8,000 5,000 10,000
Dividend Account and B's Basis
Minus Capital Component After
Transaction 247,000 245,000 255,000
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downward adjustment in the corporate dividend account would be
made in an amount equal to the dividends used to determine the
character of gain. It would be possible to limit the dividends which
could be used to qualify a gain for capital gains treatment or to avoid
the imputation of ordinary gain, to an amount bearing the same rela-
tionship to the lifetime dividend payments as the fair market value of
the liquidating distribution bears to the pre-distribution fair market
value of the corporation. This would be in keeping with the proposed
treatment of redemptions which allows a redeemed shareholder to use
only his or her pro rata share of lifetime dividend payments.
D. Distributions with Respect to Stock
The model developed has dealt with distributions by a corporation in
exchange for its own stock. The model assumes that, to the extent of a
corporation's earnings and profits, a dividend or an essentially
equivalent distribution shall be included in a recipient's gross income. 8
The earned capital gains concept would be applicable to the determina-
tion of the extent to which a distribution which exceeds both earnings
and profits and the basis of the stock on which it is made would be
treated as a capital gain. In addition, shareholders other than the
original owner of stock who receive such a distribution will in some
cases be required to recognize an imputed ordinary gain. Unlike
redemptions and complete liquidations, a shareholder receiving a
distribution with respect to his or her shares does not surrender them,
which under the proposed treatment will require an adjustment to
capital component as well as to basis.' 9 As with complete liquidations,
48. This accords with the present 1.R.C. § 301(c)(1) which reads in relevant part: "That por-
tion of the distribution which is a dividend (as defined in section 316) shall be included in gross
income."
49. The modification required by the earned capital gains treatment can best be illustrated by
example.
Assume Corporation F was formed in 1964 by F-1 for an original capital contribution
of $10,000. In 1970, F-I sells his shares to F-2 for $100,000. F-I and F-2 will be assumed
subject to a seventy per cent rate of taxation at all times. In 1974, the corporation has a
fair market value of $160,000, has paid out lifetime dividends in the amount of $50,000,
but has no earnings and profits. If Corporation F distributes $10,000 to F-2 such distribu-
tion would constitute a return of capital reducing F-2's basis for her stock to $90,000,
reducing the fair market value of Corporation F to $150,000, and also reducing the capital
component of F-2's stock to zero. That such distribution would result in no recognition
of imputed ordinary gain under the earned capital gains approach is seen by considering
the liquidation of Corporation F. If immediately after such distribution Corporation F
adopts a plan of complete liquidation, sells its assets and distributes $150,000 to F-2 for
her stock, then F-2 will recognize an imputed ordinary gain of $20,000 (one-half of the ex-
cess of basis minus capital component over lifetime dividends), yielding a tax of $14,000.
F-2 will recognize a liquidating gain of $60,000 which will be ordinary in nature because
not matched by dividends, yielding a tax of $42,000. Thus the taxes on F-2 of $56,000 and
the tax to F-I of $31,500 on the sale of his shares to F-2, total $87,500. This is the same
total tax which would have resulted had F-I retained the ownership of his shares until
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however, if the stock's capital component is greater than a
shareholder's basis for such stock, then, any distribution in excess of
basis but not in excess of capital component should be treated as a
capital gain regardless of the status of the corporation's dividend
account."°
Thus, distributions or portions of them which but for the absence of
earnings and profits would be treated as dividends will be tested for
earned capital gains treatment in the same manner as redemptions and
complete liquidations. Any excess in value of a distribution over earn-
ings and profits will reduce basis and at the same time reduce first
capital component and then the dividend account. The excess of any
distribution over a shareholder's basis will be capital gain to the extent
matched by dividends, and ordinary gain to the extent unmatched by
dividends. The excess of any distribution over both capital component
and dividends paid will result in an imputed ordinary gain unless basis
has been, or is simultaneously, exhausted. Distributions which repre-
sent the recovery of the excess of capital component over basis will con-
stitute capital gain irrespective of the status of the corporation's divi-
liquidation.
If Corporation F makes a second distribution of $10,000 to F-2 shortly after the first
distribution, then the fair market value of the corporation will be reduced to $140,000 and
the basis of F-2's stock will be reduced by $10,000 to $80,000. Since the capital compon-
ent of F-2's shares is already zero, a reduction of $10,000 in the dividend account of Cor-
poration F should be made. Again we can test the appropriateness of this treatment by
looking at the tax consequences of the liquidation of Corporation F immediately after
such second distribution. F-2 will recognize an imputed ordinary gain of $20,000 (one-
half of basis minus capital component over dividend account, or one-half of, $80,000
minus zero, minus $40,000), yielding a tax of $14,000. F-2 will also recognize an ordinary
gain on liquidation of $60,000 yielding $42,000 in tax. Again, the tax consequences of a
liquidation would be the same as if F-I had retained the ownership of his shares until
liquidation.
If immediately after the second distribution, Corporation F makes a third distribu-
tion to F-2 in the amount of $50,000, then the fair market value of the corporation will be
reduced to $90,000 and the basis of F-2's stock will be reduced to $30,000. Capital com-
ponent has already been reduced to zero. Forty thousand dollars of the distribution will
be applied to dividend account reducing it to zero. The $10,000 by which the distribution
exceeds both capital component and dividend account will therefore trigger an imputed
ordinary gain in an amount equal to one-half of the difference obtained by subtracting
capital component from the lesser of such excess or the basis of the shares on which the
distribution is made. Accordingly, F-2 will recognize an imputed ordinary gain of $5,000,
yielding a tax of $3,500. If Corporation F liquidates immediately after such third
distribution then F-2 will recognize an imputed ordinary gain in the amount of $15,000(one-half of excess of basis minus capital component over dividend account), yielding$10,500 in tax. F-2 will again recognize an ordinary gain of $60,000 on the liquidating
distribution ($90,000 minus $30,000, unmatched by dividends). Thus the requirement
that F-2 recognize imputed ordinary gain after the exhaustion of capital component and
dividend account operates to preserve the integrity of the proposed earned capital gains
treatment.
50. To illustrate this point, assume that Corporation G is formed by G-i for a capital con-
tribution of $10,000. G-I sells his shares to G-2 for $5,000. If Corporation G distributes $10,000
to G-2 at a time when the corporation has a fair market value of $20,000 and a zero dividend ac-
count, then capital component is reduced to zero and G-2's gain of $5,000 is treated as capital gain
despite the absence of matching dividends.
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
dend account.
E. Distributions under Section 333
Section 333 of the Code allows a corporation to distribute all of its
property in complete liquidation with gain recognized only to the extent
of the corporation's earnings and profits and with the distributed assets
taking a basis in the hands of the distributee shareholders equal to their
basis in the stock surrendered less money received and plus gain
recognized. However, section 333 may not be used by a collapsible cor-
poration other than one meeting the requirements of section 341(e). 1
This exclusion indicates a lack of Congressional sentiment for the for-
mation of corporations with the intention to liquidate them shortly
thereafter. Bittker states that section 333 was "enacted in 1938 pri-
marily to permit the liquidation of personal holding companies that had
been recently subjected to unexpectedly heavy tax burdens"5 and was
intended to be only a temporary provision. Thus, section 333 may be
viewed as an anachronism which has outlived its purpose, and
therefore, should be repealed. Moreover, its present form is certainly
at odds with the concept of earned capital gains treatment developed to
this point.
This article does not advocate section 333's retention. If, however,
Congress periodically adds relief provisions to the Code or if it elects to
allow shareholders to withdraw their assets from the corporation with a
deferral of gain, such provisions must be consistent with the earned
capital gains concept. For instance, it would be possible to modify sec-
tion 333 so that if a corporation could be completely liquidated under
section 331(a) at full capital gains treatment because of its dividend
history, shareholders could elect to receive and retain the corporation's
assets, postponing until later their recognition of capital gain."
51. As stated in B. BIT-rKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS, § 12.07 at 12-23:
It is perilous to summarize the fearfully intricate conditions of § 34 1(e), but its underlying
theory is that the collapsible corporation provisions should not be applicable if the net
unrealized appreciation in the corporation's 'subsection (e) assets' (roughly speaking,
property held by the corporation which would produce ordinary income if sold by the cor-
poration itself or by its principal shareholders) amounts to less than 15 per cent of the cor-
poration's net worth.
52. Id. at § 11.20 n.29.
53. For example, assume Corporation XYZ was formed in 1964 to construct and operate a
shopping center. The original incorporator A had a capital component for her shares of $50,000.
B purchased A's shares in 1970 for $450,000. The shopping center is XYZ's sole asset and has a
net fair market value of $750,000. XYZ has no money or earnings and profits. XYZ has paid out
$70,000 in dividends each year from 1966-75 for a total dividend account of $700,000, which
equals the corporate net asset value ($750,000 fair market value of assets minus $50,000 capital
component). Thus XYZ is a Fully Qualified Corporation and B would qualify for full capital
gains treatment on a liquidating distribution, resulting in a capital gain of $30,000. A revision of
I.R.C. § 333 which allowed B to receive the shopping center in liquidation without recognition of
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F. Section 341
The proposed treatment of distributions in complete or partial
liquidation, in redemption, and of distributions which would be
dividends but for the absence of earnings and profits, and the suggested
deletion of section 333, provide an objective test for determining when
and to what extent preferential tax treatment is to be extended to cor-
porate distributions. The test would apply to all corporations
regardless of the subjective inquiry which the present section 341
employs," ' and would turn on actual use of the corporate form. This
article does not purport to analyze the complexities of section 341, but
suggests that adoption of the earned capital gains concept would make
its elimination possible."
G. Boot in Reorganizations and Corporate Divisions
Boot received in connection with a tax-free reorganization or cor-
porate division is treated presently under Code sections 356(a) and
356(b)."6 It is beyond this article's scope to evaluate the merits of this
treatment under the present corporate taxation scheme. It is relevant,
however, to illustrate how the treatment of boot in such sections could
be made consistent with the proposed treatment for other corporate
distributions.
Section 356(a) deals with the taxation of gains to a shareholder upon
receipt of money or property ("boot") not entitled to be received
without recognition of gain under section 354(a). Gain is measured by
subtracting the transferor shareholder's basis in the shares which he or
she surrenders from the fair market value of the property received in ex-
change, and then taxing, as either capital gain or ordinary income, the
amount of the shareholder's gain, but not in excess of the boot
gain and with a basis to B of $450,000 would not be inconsistent with the earned capital gains con-
cept.
54. Collapsible corporation status turns on whether a corporation is formed or availed of
with the requisite "view." The determination of whether the requisite "view" existed and when
such "view" existed are inherently subjective issues. The relevant portion of l.R.C. § 341(b)(1) is
set out in note 8 supra.
55. Consider the classic motion picture collapsible corporation. If a corporation, formed
with an original capital contribution of $10,000, produced a movie having a fair market value of
$1,000,000, and before receiving any earnings distributed the movie in complete liquidation, then,
the earned capital gains treatment of complete liquidation would result in $990,000 of ordinary in-
come to the shareholders because of the lack of dividends. If the shares of the corporation were
sold for more than the capital component, then, to the extent of such excess the purchaser would
be subject to a contingent imputed ordinary gain. If the movie were distributed as a dividend,
then, the proposed revision to I.R.C. § 301(c), seeSection II(D) supra, would result in ordinary
gain treatment for the distributor since the excess of distribution over basis would be unmatched
by dividend payments.
56. The term "boot" refers to property received in an exchange which is not entitled to be
received without the recognition of gain. I.R.C. §§ 354 and 355 set forth the conditions under
which stock and securities may be received without the recognition of gain. I.R.C. §§ 356(a) and
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received. The following example demonstrates how section 356(a)
works.57
In an exchange to which section 354 would apply but for the pro-
hibited boot involved, A receives in exchange for a share of stock hav-
ing an adjusted basis to A of $85:
One share of stock worth ............................... $100
C ash ................................................. 25
Other property (basis $25) fair market value ................ 50
Total fair market value of consideration
received .......................................... $175
Adjusted basis of stock surrendered in exchange ............ 85
Total G ain ........................................... $ 90
Gain to be recognized, limited to cash and
other property to be received ....................... $ 75
A's pro rata share of earnings and profits
(taxable dividend) ................................. $ 30
Remainder to be treated as gain from the
exchange of property .............................. $ 45
Under the proposed treatment of exchange transactions, gain in ex-
cess of A's ratable share of earnings and profits will be entitled to
capital gains treatment only to the extent qualified by the dividend
account of the issuer of A's shares. Assume that the issuer of A's share
prior to the exchange had a dividend account of $10,000 and that A's
pro rata share of this account was $20. Application of the earned
capital gains concept to the $45 excess of boot over dividend will result
in A recognizing a $20 capital gain and a $25 ordinary gain, rather than
the $45 capital gain which would result under present section 356(a).
Current section 356(b) treats boot as a distribution of property sub-
ject to section 301. Earlier, this article outlined a suggested amendment
of section 301."' Thus, for purposes of the proposal, the reference in
section 356(b) would refer to the amended section 301.
III. ALLOCATION OF CONTRIBUTED CAPITAL
AMONG SHAREHOLDERS
To this point, the article has assumed a corporation simple in its
capital structure. Now, attention is directed to the problems of com-
plexity. Initial focus will be on corporations coming into existence after
the enactment of the proposed legislation. Implementation of the
356(b) govern the treatment of "boot."
57. This illustration is taken from Treas. Reg. § 1.356-1(c), Example I.
58. See discussion of amendment of I.R.C. § 301, in Section I(D) supra.
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earned capital gains systems which looks to originally contributed
capital in measuring imputed gains upon exchange transactions
(whether in partial or complete liquidation or in redemption) requires a
method of allocating contributed capital among shareholders so as to
avoid hindering the stock market's functioning.
To illustrate the problem, this section will first consider the allocation
made necessary by different issues of the same class of stock being made
at different issue prices. In connection with this, the two best methods
for effectuating such allocation - the "immediate averaging of capital
component method" and the "sliding capital component method" -
will be set forth. This section will then examine the problems of alloca-
tion which may arise in connection with convertible securities,
reorganizations, stock outstanding on the effective date of legislation
incorporating the article's proposal, and sections 305 and 306. For pur-
poses of discussing the allocation of contributed capital, the amount of
money or fair market value of property originally contributed for a
stock or security shall continue to be termed the "capital component"
of such share.
A. Capital Component and Different Issues of Stock
The necessity of allocating the capital component will often arise
because of the possibility of many different issues of the same class of
stock being made at different issue prices. If these issue prices are to
have importance upon the complete liquidation of the corporation, and
for other transactions, then either a separate market must be developed
for trading in each issue of stock or a method of allocating capital
among shareholders of different issues of the same class of stock must
be developed.
Consider a publicly held corporation with one outstanding class of
common stock issued for, and having a capital component of, $100 per
share. No need for allocation is present as each purchaser of a share
will take such share with its capital component of $100. In almost every
case, however, a company going public will have existing shares
outstanding of the class of stock being offered to the public, which ex-
isting shares will normally have a capital component different than the
price at which the public offering is being made. Indeed, a portion of
the public offering is often composed of the shares previously outstand-
ing which are owned by the original investors. Hypothesizing that there
are existing and outstanding 1000 shares of the common stock of Cor-
poration A with a capital component of $50 per share, and that a public
offering is made of 2000 shares of common stock (including 500 of the
originally outstanding shares) at $100 per share, then, the prob-
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lem of different issue prices becomes clear. What is to be the capital
component of a share purchased from the previously outstanding
category? If we are to avoid the necessity of creating separate markets
for different issues of stock, and in this case separate markets even
within the same issue, then, it is necessary to avoid treating each share
sold as having a capital component of $50 per share if it happens to
have been owned by an original incorporator, and $100 per share if it
happens to be a newly issued share.
1. Immediate Averaging of Capital Component
There are two ways of treating the capital component of the shares in-
volved in this transaction. The first would require that each of the pur-
chasers of shares in the public offering be viewed as buying newly issued
shares and previously outstanding shares in the same proportion as the
total of such newly issued shares in the public offering bears to the total
of such previously outstanding shares in the offering, with the capital
component of such shares then being the average capital component of
the shares included in the public offering. Thus, a purchaser of all 2000
shares in the public offering would take such shares with a capital com-
ponent of $87.50 per share (1500 shares at $100 per share and 500 shares
at $50 per share). A purchaser of any lesser number of shares would
also take such lesser number of shares with a capital component of
$87.50 per share.
A problem remains in connection with the 500 shares having a capital
component of $50 which were not involved in the public offering. At
some point, these shares may also be offered in the public market again
creating the need for either a separate market or a further method of
allocating the capital component. The second possibility, then, for
treatment of the public offering is to include the capital component of
all previously outstanding shares in the capital component computation
made as a result of the public issue whether any or all of such previously
outstanding shares are included in the public offering. In the example
above, this would result in a capital component of $80 per share.
As theoretical justification for averaging the capital component of all
outstanding shares of a class, whether included in the public offering or
not, one could look at the public offering as having occurred as follows.
The holders of the existing 1000 stock shares purchase from the cor-
poration 1.5 newly issued shares at $100 per share for each share which
they presently hold. This gives each pre-offering shareholder shares
with an average capital component of $80 per share. The holders, then,
elect to retain 500 of their shares with a capital component of $80 and to
sell in the public offering 2,000 of their shares, having the same capital
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component. The sellers of the 1500 shares purchased for $100 would
have no gain upon its resale for $100 in the public market.5 9 Thus, the
public offering could have been arranged as a secondary offering by the
original shareholders with the same financial results to both the cor-
poration and the holders of stock outstanding prior to the issue as
would occur in a public offering made directly by the corporation. Since
the transaction could have been arranged as a secondary offering by the
original shareholders, there should be no objections to treating the
transaction as if it had, in fact, so occurred for purposes of determina-
tion of the capital component of outstanding shares, unless there are
possibilities of unfairness from such treatment."0
2. Sliding Scale Capital Component Approach
Nonetheless, some may be unpersuaded by such characterization of
the public offering, feeling that the original shareholders are in fact get-
ting something - a step-up in capital component - for nothing. These
people would insist on looking at the "actual" contribution of capital.
With such concern in mind, if the corporation is not a Fully Qualified
Corporation and is liquidated while any of such pre-offering
shareholders who has received the increase in capital component is still
a shareholder, or if any of such pre-offering shareholders have their
shares redeemed in a transaction not essentially equivalent to a dividend
at a time when the corporation is not a Fully Qualified Corporation,
then such shareholder will be viewed as recognizing either less imputed
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(c) provides in relevant part as follows:
If shares of stock in a corporation are sold or transferred by a taxpayer who purchased or
acquired lots of stock on different dates or at different prices, and the lot from which the
stock was sold or transferred cannot be adequately identified, the stock sold or transferred
shall be charged against the earliest of such lots purchased or acquired in order to deter-
mine the cost or other basis of such stock and in order to determine the holding period of
such stock for purposes of subchapter P, chapter I of the Code. If, on the other hand, the
lot from which the stock is sold or transferred can be adequately identified, the rule stated
in the preceding sentence is not applicable.
60. No objection can be made to such a system on behalf of purchasers of stock in such offer-
ing since the capital component possibilities presumably will be disclosed adequately as a result of
the requirements of the federal and state securities laws. In theory, the issue price of such stock
will be discounted by an amount necessary to reflect the risk of liquidation and the difference be-
tween issue price and capital component and dividend history. It will be noted that the holders of
common stock unsold in the offering have obtained a step-up in their capital component without
any additional capital contribution on their part. No one, however, has been defrauded by such
step-up. The purchasing shareholders were aware of this result before their purchase. The total
tax upon liquidation of the corporation will be based on the total contributed capital of the cor-
poration and thus the treasury will not be shortchanged. Additionally, the step-up is merely inci-
dent to an issuance of shares for the business purpose of enhancing the continued operation of the
corporation. Upon a sale by the continuing shareholders their basis in the shares will have been
unaffected by the step-up in the capital component and their gain on such shares will be the excess
of sale price over basis. Thus, since the transactions will not occur in contemplation of liquida-
tion, objection to a step-up in the capital component of the shares held by shareholders prior to
and after a new offering may be regarded as an insignificant problem.
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ordinary gain than his or her own "actual" capital contribution Would
entitle him or her. Conversely, the purchaser of shares in the public
offering will recognize more imputed ordinary gain than his or her
"actual" contribution ($100) would entitle him or her. Under such
view it would be appropriate, therefore, to require each pre-offering
shareholder in the event of an exchange transaction to use the capital
component which his or her own actual capital contribution entitles him
or her (in this case $50). In the event of his or her sale of the shares, the
purchaser would take the shares with the same capital component as the
other publicly traded shares, which capital component would, however,
depend on the number of pre-offering outstanding shares still in the
hands of its original owners. 6 '
The problems resulting from the sliding capital component approach
can be shown by considering two subsequent public issues of treasury
stock by Corporation A, the first being 1,000 shares at $200 per share,
and the second being 2,500 shares at $75 per share. The following table
illustrates the capital component effect of these issues under both
approaches to capital component outlined above.
Capital Component of
original 500 shares
purchasers of first iss
original 500 shares
purchasers of first iss
purchasers of second
original 500 shares
purchasers of first iss
purchasers of second
purchasers of third is:
TABLE III
AFTER FIRST ISSUE
1st approach*
$ 80
ue $ 80
AFTER SECOND ISSUE
$114.29
ue $114.29
issue $114.29
AFTER THIRD ISSUE
$ 97.92
ue $ 97.92
issue $ 97.92
sue $ 97.92
2nd approach"
$50
$80-$ 87.50
$50
$80-$ 87.50
$114.29-$200.00
$50
$80-$ 87.50
$114.29-$200.00
$75-$ 97.92
*The first approach is the method whereby the capital component of all outstanding stock is
averaged.
"The second approach is the averaging of only those shares actually included in the issue.
61. This approach can be theoretically justified by picturing the original public offering as in-
cluding all 2,500 shares of the corporation, with the purchasers to be construed as buying 1,000
shares from the old shareholders and 1,500 shares from the corporation with the resulting capital
component for each share of $80. However, 500 of the shares of stock (that not included in the
public offering) is not to be sold until some later date. If none of the withheld shares are sold
before liquidation, or are redeemed, then the capital component of the shares actually sold in the
public offering would be $87.50. If some, but not all of the withheld shares are sold before
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3. Comparison of Two Methods of Allocation
The above chart shows that the use of the sliding capital com-
ponent calculation would create extensive bookkeeping problems for
companies. More importantly, it indicates that in the publicly held cor-
poration the sliding capital component system is not more equitable
than the immediate averaging of capital component system. While the
sliding capital component may prevent the pre-offering continuing
shareholders from, in the view of some, obtaining an unjustified step-
up in their capital component, it does not solve the problem of subse-
quent purchasers after the public issue. Are these subsequent pur-
chasers to be given an average capital component or are they also to be
given a sliding capital component depending on which shares are
ultimately sold? If they are to be given an average capital component,
then the total contributed capital of the corporation will not equal the
total capital component of its outstanding shares until all outstanding
shares have changed hands once. If they are to be given a sliding capital
component, then the amount of their capital component will not only
be uncertain, but the investor will lack knowledge as to the likelihood of
sale by holders of low capital component or high capital component
shares. It is submitted that it is equitable to use the average capital
component approach whereby the capital component of all outstanding
shares are averaged with the capital contributed for newly issued shares,
and the use of such approach for publicly-held corporations is the only
feasible means of implementing a system which attempts to take into
account originally contributed capital in measuring imputed ordinary
gains on redemptions, liquidations, or distributions which would be
dividends but for the absence of earnings and profits.
It should be remembered that a publicly-held corporation will still
have a means of preventing the averaging of capital components upon a
new issue of stock. For instance, a company having a low capital com-
ponent for its existing shares, a deficient dividend account, and a
somewhat speculative future, might feel that a new issue would find
greater investor acceptance if the shares to be issued were to take a
capital component equal to the issue price, rather than a lower averaged
capital component. Such a corporation could accomplish the capital
component-issue price equivalency by issuing a new class of stock.
The situation of the small closely-held, privately traded corporation
liquidation then the capital component would be adjusted downward accordingly. Thus, pur-
chasers take their shares with a sliding capital component, the parameters of which are known, but
the exact amount of which varies depending from time to time on the number of originally
withheld shares still unsold. This approach would seem to be equitable, but one would have grave
doubts as to its practicality.
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is different. Since buyers and sellers have a direct relationship, and
since complex capital structures are unlikely to arise, it is suggested that
closely-held, privately traded corporations would be able to use the
actual contributed capital for their shares as its capital component,
rather than the average capital component method. Each closely-held
corporation could elect the method of capital component computation
by which it wished to be governed, such election to be accomplished by
such methods as the Internal Revenue Service should direct. Upon
going public, a corporation would be governed by the average capital
component method.62
B. Capital Component and Convertible Stock
Convertible stock or securities presents a different problem. Suppose
Corporation ABC has since its incorporation had outstanding 100
shares of common stock having a capital component and original fair
market value of $10 per share, and 100 shares of preferred stock having
a capital component and original fair market value of $20 per share
which preferred stock is convertible one share for one share into com-
mon stock. If the corporation is privately held and on the actual capital
component method, the conversion of forty shares of preferred into
common will result in the newly outstanding common having a capital
component of $20, the same as the preferred from which it was
converted.
If ABC were publicly held and forty preferred shares were converted
to common, is there a way to justify the use of the average capital com-
ponent netted? One possibility would be to require the averaging of the
capital component upon the issuance of the convertible securities as if
the securities holders had received common stock at the outset. The
later conversions would cause no change in the capital com-
ponent. This approach might be acceptable for corporations with
62. Suppose that a privately-held Corporation XYZ has elected to use the actual capital com-
ponent method, and has three shareholders A, B, and C owning ten shares of common stock each.
A's shares have a capital component of $10 per share, B's shares have a capital component of $20
per share and C's shares have a capital component of $25 per share. XYZ plans to go public by
issuing 100 shares of common stock at $100 per share. None of the original shareholders is selling
any of his or her shares in such public issue. The capital component of the 130 shares which will
be outstanding after the public offering will be $81.15 determined by dividing the total contributed
capital of the corporation by the number of outstanding shares. The result is understood by
visualizing the capital formation history of XYZ as follows: A forms XYZ for a capital contribu-
tion of $100, receiving in exchange 10 shares of XYZ common; XYZ issues 10 shares of common
to A for $20 per share, giving A an average capital component of $15 per share for each of his 20
shares; XYZ issues 10 shares of common to A and 5 shares to B for $25 per share, giving both A
and B an average capital component of $18.33 for their shares; A and B each sell their last ac-
quired 5 shares to C at their cost of $25 per share; XYZ issues 33 3 shares of common stock each
to A, B, and C for $100 per share, giving A, B, and C an average capital component of $81.15 for
their 43 13 shares; A, B, and C each sell their last acquired 33 '3 shares in a public offering for their
cost of $100.
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clearly sufficient dividend accounts since the preferred shareholders
would not, therefore, face a risk of imputation of ordinary gain on
redemptions, an event quite likely to occur in case of preferred stock.
For corporations which are not Fully Qualified Corporations, there
would always be the possibility of creating a new class of common into
which the preferred may be converted. Still the feeling remains that
perhaps convertible stock is a unique animal which should retain its
actual capital component until conversion occurs. Unlike the case of
various issues of the same class of stock with different capital com-
ponents where resale cannot be predicted, and where fluctuations in the
capital component of shares would occur almost daily in the absence of
the immediate average capital component approach, convertible
securities are likely to be limited as to the period in which conversion
may occur, to all be converted when the market price of the stock into
which it is convertible becomes attractive, and, in any event, to be
redeemable enabling the corporation to eliminate capital component
problems by redemption if it wishes. Moreover, the likely timing of a
change in capital component and its effect on the capital component of
the shares of the same class into which it is converted, can be much
more readily described to, and understood by, investors. Accordingly,
it would appear appropriate to allow a publicly-held corporation to
elect to have capital component adjustments in the case of convertible
securities made either on their issuance (average capital component
method) or upon actual conversions.
C. Capital Component Computations in Reorganizations
Another concern in the use of the capital component concept is the
area of reorganization. Tax-free reorganizations may be broken down
into two categories - those resulting in the amalgamation of previously
existing corporations63 and those resulting in the division of an existing
corporation.6" In the latter category of tax-free divisive transactions,
there also may be included divisions of a corporation in transactons
other than a reorganization. 6
From a capital component standpoint, divisive transactions are less
troublesome than amalgamating ones. Divisive transactions will
require the allocation of existing equal capital components among the
shares of the resulting entities so as to retain the equality within each
class of stock and securities. Amalgamating transactions will result in
exchanges of stock having different capital components, and will
63. Tax-free amalgamating transactions are reorganizations defined in I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A),
(B), (C), (D) (but only if the requirements of I.R.C. § 354(b)(1) are met), and (F).
64. Tax-free divisive transactions are those which meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 355.
65. I.R.C. § 355(a)(2)(C).
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require a method of amalgamating the capital component of the
resulting outstanding shares. As with new issues and convertible stock,
the treatment of capital component will be critical in the case of publicly
held corporations, with the average capital component approach being
applied where necessary to avoid impairment of the stock market.
The capital component of stock or securities distributed in a tax-free
corporate division should, as with the basis of such stock or securities,
be determined in accordance with the general principle of section 358 of
the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, the capital component of the stock
and securities previously held by the recipients of the divisive distribu-
tion will be allocated in accordance with relative fair market value
among the newly received stock and securities and the retained stock
and securities, subject to additions and subtractions as described in sec-
tion 358(a)(1)(A) and (B). Since an amalgamation is not involved, such
allocation presumably will involve stock and securities, each class of
which has a common capital component for its constituent securities.
The allocation of capital component between stock and securities
received in exchange for existing stock or as a distribution in respect
thereof, and the existing or retained stock, will not cause the capital
component of particular shares of stock within a class of new or
retained securities to differ from one another.
An amalgamating transaction will often result in stock of different
corporations, and thus different capital components, being exchanged
for shares of the same class of stock of one corporation. In a privately
traded corporation, the general rule of section 358 may be extended to
the determination of capital component so that the capital component
of a share received in a tax-free amalgamating exchange will retain the
capital component of the stock surrendered. As with new issues of
stock, such a result would be unworkable in a publicly traded corpora-
tion. A look at various amalgamating transactions and their effect on
the capital component of the shares of the resulting corporation will
show how capital component problems must be handled in
amalgamating reorganizations. In this regard, the following example is
illustrative:
Corporation A
10,000 shares of common stock
Capital component - $50,000 ($5 per share)
Fair Market Value - $500,000 ($50 per share)
Corporation B
20,000 shares of common stock
Capital component - $400,000 ($20 per share)
Fair Market Value - $1,000,000 ($50 per share)
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Consider first an A reorganization, where A and B are to be con-
solidated into AB, with shareholders of A and B receiving one share of
the common stock of AB for each share of A and B, respectively, sur-
rendered in exchange. A closely held corporation would be entitled to
use the actual capital component method. Under the actual capital
component method each share of A common stock would be exchanged
for a share of AB common stock having a capital component of $20 per
share.
Publicly held companies would use either the two class common
approach or the average capital component approach. Under the two
class common approach, a corporation would achieve the same actual
capital component result as outlined in the immediately preceding
paragraph, with each surrendered share's capital being passed on to the
shares of AB common received in exchange. Former A shareholders
would hold AB class A common and former B shareholders would hold
AB class B common. Under the average capital component approach
the shareholders of A and B would receive one share of AB common
stock having a capital component of $15 per share for each share of A
or B common stock, respectively, surrendered. This result is justified
by the rationale that the shareholders of A and of B have decided to
pool their investment."
D. Capital Component and Stock Outstanding Prior
to Effective Date of Proposal.
Having examined the effect of the capital component concept on
share transactions occurring after the effective date of any new legisla-
tion, it is now necessary to consider the consequences of such a change
on existing outstanding stock issued at many different prices and with
many different bases. Assume a corporation with one class of common
stock outstanding, which stock was issued as follows: 1,000 shares at
$50 per share; 1,500 shares at $100 per share; 1,000 shares at $200 per
share; 2,500 shares at $75 per share. Immediately allocating the capital
component on an averaging approach among all shares would result in
a capital component of $97.92 per share.
66. Thus it is as if the A shareholders transferred pro rata 2/3 of their shares (6,666-/ shares
worth $50 per share) for /3 of the shares of B (6,6662/3 shares worth $50 per share) also transferred
pro rata by the B shareholders. The effect of such hypothetical transaction is that the former
shareholders of A now own 3,333/3 shares of A and 6,6662/3 shares of B. The former
shareholders of B now own 6,6662 3 shares of A and 3,333 /3 shares of B. The fair market value of
the holdings of each set of shareholders is unchanged, but the average capital component of the
holdings of each set of shareholders is now $15 per share. The shareholders of A and B now ex-
change their mixture of '/3A and 2/B shares for shares of AB. Similar analysis applied to B and C
reorganizations and to amalgamating D and F reorganizations would yield the same treatment
options for the corporations and shareholders involved.
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Objection on equitable grounds might be made to legislation resulting
in the immediate use of $97.92 as the capital component of stock held
by existing shareholders, since shareholders have purchased shares in
the anticipation that such purchase price will be their basis for section
331 exchanges in complete liquidation. Accordingly, shareholders who
purchased or were issued their shares at prices above the average capital
component will feel that such purchase price should constitute the
capital component of their shares.
A delayed form of implementation would allow all present holders of
stock to use as the capital component of their stock the price at which it
was purchased. Purchasers after the effective date would take the stock
purchased with an average capital component (of $97.92 in the above
example). This approach, however, would result in the total con-
tributed capital and the total capital component of all shares being un-
equal until all shares held before the effective date have been sold.
Moreover, allowing holders of stock on the effective date of any legisla-
tion introducing the capital component concept to continue indefinitely
to utilize their present bases in lieu of capital component would be an
unhealthy inducement to such shareholders to retain shares they might
otherwise sell. Accordingly, it might be appropriate to stay the effec-
tive date of the earned capital gains treatment proposed in this article
until a period of years after its passage, with the averaging of all existing
shares within a class resulting even for pre-legislation shareholders on
such effective date. This would allow time for the impact of such
legislation to be explained to investors and allow investors an oppor-
tunity to adjust portfolios. The Commissioner could be authorized to
grant exceptions to such averaging of capital components in
appropriate situations. Regulations also might be necessary to handle
the problem of corporations, if any, whose records do not contain all
information necessary to trace back capital component; it would seem
unlikely that many corporations would be unable to determine their
total capital component.
The above analysis of the capital component problems caused by
various issues of stock of the same class, by conversions of stock from
one class into another, and by amalgamating reorganizations, suggests
that such concept, while certain to produce complexity of definition
and example in the Internal Revenue Service Regulations, could be
utilized without unduly impairing the functioning of the stock market.
The general principle would be to require each share of a class of stock
to have a common capital component with other shares in such class,
except for stock of privately-held companies which elect to use the
actual contributed capital approach. Implementation of such proposal
would be delayed for a period of time to allow the effect of such
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changes to be understood and adjusted for by investors.
E. Capital Component and Sections 305 and 306
An area of concern in utilizing the capital component concept is sec-
tions 305 and 306 stock. What is the capital component of stock
distributed in a distribution described in section 305(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code? Upon formation of a corporation, the capital com-
ponent of shares issued in exchange for contributed property is the
amount of the money plus the basis in the hands of the transferor of
other property contributed. Such money or property to the extent of its
basis in the hands of the transferor has been fully taxed. Stock
distributed in a distribution described in section 305(b) will be taxed to a
recipient as if he or she had received from the corporation a money divi-
dend equal to the fair market value of the stock received and had then
purchased from the corporation, with fully taxed funds, the stock so
distributed. Accordingly, the capital component of stock distributed as
described in section 305(b) should equal its fair market value. As we
have seen with the public issue of shares where existing shares are
outstanding, 7 the possibility of different capital components for stock
of the same class must be avoided. The types of situations covered by
section 305 and the capital component adjustments necessitated by each
situation are discussed below.
The first situation is two class common stock where each share of
each class is entitled to share equally in the assets and earnings of the
corporation.68 If one class receives a dividend payable in cash and one
class receives a dividend payable in additional shares of such class, then
the additional shares are treated as a distribution of property under sec-
tion 301 to the extent of their fair market value. Accordingly, the
capital component of all shares of the class receiving such stock divi-
dend should be determined immediately after such dividend by adding
the contributed capital of such class before the dividend and the total
fair market value of the stock dividend, and then dividing the sum so
obtained by the total number of shares of such class outstanding after
such stock dividend.
The second situation would be distributions of convertible pre-
ferred stock treated under section 305(b)(5) as a distribution of property
to which section 301 applies. Such convertible preferred will take as its
capital component its fair market value, and the stock as to which it was
issued will take a sliding capital component with adjustments occurring
upon conversions. The limits of the changes in capital component
67. See discussion of Publicly Held Corporations, Section III(A)(3) supra.
68. See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), Example 1.
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which will result if conversion ultimately occurs can be set at the time of
the issuance of the convertible stock.69 Since convertible preferred
stock will not be subjected to treatment as a distribution subject to sec-
tion 301 unless it appears likely that some of such convertible stock will
be converted into stock and some into money, and since a short dura-
tion of the right of conversion is one of the factors leading to such a
conclusion, the sliding capital component will likely become an average
capital component within a reasonable time after the dividend.
A third area covered by section 305(b)(2) is distributions resulting in
the receipt of property by some shareholders and an increase in the pro-
portionate interests of other shareholders. In a privately traded cor-
poration electing actual capital component treatment, the shareholders
receiving stock have their capital component allocated between the old
and new stock in the same manner as stock distributed in the two-class
common situation described above. Subsequent purchasers of such
class of stock take such stock with a sliding capital component which
adjusts as subsequent sales are made. In electing privately held cor-
porations and in publicly traded corporations, unless the two-class com-
mon approach was used, the transaction would be viewed as a pro-rata
stock dividend to all shareholders resulting in an average capital com-
ponent, followed by a sale of the dividend stock to the actual stock divi-
dend recipients.
Section 305 also deals with the consequences of increasing and
decreasing conversion ratios, and the issuance of common on common
where no adequate anti-dilution provision exists for outstanding con-
vertible securities. The capital component of stock whose conversion
ratio is increased would be adjusted by increasing such capital com-
ponent by an amount equal to the increase in the fair market value of
such stock treated as a distribution of property subject to section 301. If
the conversion ratio of convertible stock is decreased, the capital
component of the stock into which it is convertible is increased by the
fair market value of such change (the amount treated as distribution of
property subject to section 301). In the absence of adequate anti-
dilution provisions for outstanding convertible securities, the capital
component of common stock will be the capital component of the pre-
dividend shares averaged as in the two class common example. In the
case of a proscribed original issue discount, the capital component will
be increased as, and to the extent that, such premium is treated as a
distribution of property subject to section 301. Stock which is not pur-
suant to section 305(b) or (c) treated as a distribution of property sub-
ject to section 301 will not be subject to taxation upon distribution.
69. See Section 11(B) supra.
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Some of such stock (section 306 stock) will h , r be subject to dividend
treatment under section 306 upon its disposition, while other of such
stock will not. Additionally, section 306 stock includes certain stock
received in a reorganization or in an exchange under section 355. Sec-
tion 306 stock is not subject to dividend taxation until it is disposed of
and then only if it is not disposed of in a transaction satisfying one of
the exceptions set forth in section 306(b) or (c). Because the eventual
tax burden imposed on section 306 stock cannot be determined until its
disposition, it seems essential administratively to require that the capital
component of all stock or stock rights received in a distribution to
which section 305(a) applies be determined by allocating between the
old stock and the new stock the capital component of the old stock.
This could be accomplished pursuant to regulations of the Commis-
sioner as under section 307.10 The consequence of such a structure is
that a purchaser of section 305(a) stock will take such stock with a
capital component other than the purchase price which he or she pays,
even though the seller will have incurred dividend treatment on the sale
proceeds. Under the suggested treatment of section 305 transactions as
being the equivalent of a section 351 contribution of tax paid funds, a
purchaser of section 306 stock ideally would be entitled to a cost capital
component for his or her shares, but such is not feasible. Presumably
this fact will be considered by a purchaser if the purchaser is other than
a tax-exempt entity. Of course, if the corporation is by its dividend
history a Fully Qualified Corporation, then a purchaser of section 306
stock would not be concerned by this problem.
IV. TAX AVOIDANCE AND CARRYOVER OF
DIVIDEND ACCOUNT
A proposition often cited by those commenting on the practic-
ability of treating the gain realized on liquidating distributions as other
than capital gain is that such proposals are "open to ready avoidance by
sales in anticipation of liquidation to low-bracket or charitable en-
tities.'"' To this and other possible tax avoidance problems which must
be anticipated in implementing the proposals, this article now turns.
If one rejects scrutinizing each sale of shares of an on-going corpora-
70. I.R.C. § 307(a) sets forth the following general rule:
If a shareholder in a corporation receives its stock or rights to acquire its stock ... in a
distribution to which section 305(a) applies, then the basis of such new stock and of the
stock with respect to which it is distributed . . . respectively, shall, in the shareholder's
hands, be determined by allocating betweeP the old stock and the new stock the adjusted
basis of the old stock. Such allocation shall be determined by allocating between the old
stock and the new stock the adjusted basis of the old stock. Such allocation shall be made
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary.
71. H. CALKINS, 86TH CON(. I1ST SESS., CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS AND THE
HARD ROAD TO A BROADER TAX BASE 1639 (Comm. Print 1959).
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tion for its then eligibility for full capital gains treatment based on the
dividend history of the corporation at such time,"' the problem of an-
ticipatory sales or gifts to low-bracket or tax-exempt entities may be
approached in one of two ways. Emphasis may be placed either on the
treatment of recipients of such sales or gifts, or upon the transferors,
based upon a general notion that it is not acceptable to obtain tax
benefits by participating in transfers made in anticipation of liquidation
or redemption.
Looking first at charitable gifts to tax-exempt entities, if one wishes
to prevent charitable gifts being made in anticipation of liquidation by
focusing on the donor, then what should the protective measure be?
Present law favors charitable contributions of stock by allowing a
deduction against ordinary income in the amount of the fair market
value of stock, rather than in the amount of the shareholder's basis for
these shares."' One way of stating this is that Congress will allow an in-
dividual to receive a deduction against ordinary income for the value of
contributed shares by foregoing the opportunity to sell such shares with
gain, if any, being entitled to capital gains treatment. Contributions of
shares in collapsible corporations or of section 306 stock would infringe
on this quidpro quo since the gain being foregone would not have been
entitled to capital gains treatment. However, section 170(e)(l)(A) of
the Tax Reform Act of 1969, reduced the charitable deduction available
by the amount of ordinary income which a sale of the contributed
property by the donor would have produced. A gift in anticipation of
the liquidation of a Non-Fully Qualified Corporation would involve the
avoidance of ordinary income, the exact problem which Congress
addressed in section 170(e)(1)(A). Accordingly, it is suggested that sec-
tion 170(e)(l) be amended so that the charitable deduction for any
donation of shares of stock in a Non-Fully Qualified Corporation
should be reduced by the amount of ordinary income which would be
realized by such donor if the corporation were completely liquidated on
the date of such gift."' Such a provision should deal effectively with the
possible tax avoidance problem of gifts to tax-exempt entities by the
72. See discussion of Complete Liquidation, Section I1(A) supra.
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c) provides as follows: "If a contribution is made in property other
than money, the amount of the deduction is determined by the fair market value of the property at
the time of the contribution."
74. Thus if shareholder H-I, the original incorporator of Corporation H which has a zero
dividend account, donates his shares in H (having a capital component of $100 and a fair market
value of $2,300) to a charitable institution, his deduction will be $100 since the amount of ordinary
income recognized in the event of complete liquidation would have been $2,200. If H had paid
dividends of $500 prior to the gift, making the fair market value of H $1,800, then H-I would be
entitled to a deduction of $500, the fair market value of his stock less the amount of ordinary in-
come which would have been incurred in a complete liquidation occurring on the date of the gift.
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shareholders of Non-Fully Qualified Corporations."
Focusing preventive measures on the recipient of stock in such a tax
avoidance situation seems unnecessary since the preventive measure
aimed at donors just described effectively deals with the possible prob-
lem. Moreover, a mere recipient of a gift may be thought of as an inap-
propriate entity to tax, as opposed to the donor, where the recipient has
not participated in the transaction in any manner other than would be
thought appropriate of a charity.
The measures necessary to prevent sales to low bracket or tax-exempt
entities would depend on the situations in which such sales are likely to
occur. In a closely-held corporation, these sales would likely occur as
an integral part of the liquidation process. The shareholders of a
closely-held Non-Fully Qualified Corporation desiring to liquidate, but
not wishing to bear the tax burden resulting from the corporation's divi-
dend history, would attempt to find an entity, probably tax-exempt,
which would purchase their shares, giving the sellers capital gains treat-
ment. The tax-exempt entity would subsequently liquidate the corpora-
tion recovering tax-free its investment plus the negotiated premium.
In the publicly-held situation, the anticipatory sales are more likely to
involve the dumpings of shares on the public market by high bracket en-
tities and people whose cost basis for shares exceeds the capital
component. Corporation H with a fair market value of $2300 and a
capital component of $100 for its outstanding shares, all held by the
original incorporator and sole shareholder H-l, shows the tax advan-
tages which would cause shareholders to wish to sell their shares in con-
templation of liquidation. The tax to H-1 if he caused corporation H to
liquidate would be $1540, whereas if he sold his shares for $2200 (a
liquidating distribution would be $2300) to a tax-exempt entity, then his
tax is $735. The after tax yield to H-1 is $705 more if he sells his shares
instead of liquidating. The tax-exempt entity will then liquidate H
receiving tax-free the return of its $2200 investment plus a $100
premium.
Focusing preventive measures on the seller of stock in contemplation
of liquidation would require a provision that any sale in contemplation
of liquidation would be allowed capital gains treatment only to the ex-
tent that the dividend history of the corporation would have qualified
an exchange in liquidation occurring on the date of sale for capital gains
treatment. In a closely-held business, particularly one where the cor-
poration's value is largely in passive investments such as real estate, it
may be difficult to determine whether sales have occurred in contempla-
75. In addition, such a provision, coupled with the earned capital gains tax treatment for
redemptions concept, might be helpful in the life income cases. See, e.g., Grove v. Commissioner,
490 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1973).
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tion of liquidation. Suppose the major asset of H, other than cash, is a
shopping center managed by a management company unrelated to H-1.
If H-I sells his shares to a tax-exempt entity for $200, the transferee may
well be prepared to wait several years before liquidating the corpora-
tion. Accordingly, it may be necessary to provide that any sale of
shares to a tax-exempt entity, other than sales which are made over the
counter or on a public exchange, should result in capital gains treatment
to a seller of shares only to the extent qualified by a dividend deduction
determined as of the date of sale, regardless of whether such sales are
made in contemplation of liquidation.
Sales by shareholders of a publicly-traded corporation would be
easier to police. The disclosure requirements of the various securities
laws will require notice of any planned liquidation.76 From the date
knowledge of a possible liquidation is disseminated, all sales of shares
should be entitled to capital gains treatment only to the extent of the
corporation's dividend account, with imputed ordinary gain if
applicable, except that if a decision is made not to liquidate then such
seller of shares would be entitled to full capital gains treatment. A pur-
chaser of shares during such a limbo period would be entitled to use his
or her cost basis as capital component if liquidation in fact occurred,
but not otherwise.
Redemptions will create a different problem in some respects than
liquidations. A person who sells his or her shares in the market with
knowledge that an offer to redeem is outstanding, must be thought to
be selling in contemplation of such redemption. To taint all such sales
would inhibit the stock market. Perhaps the best course is to impose a
seventy per cent tax on the gain (redemption price minus capital com-
ponent) of all shares voluntarily tendered for redemption by a tax-
exempt entity, unless all of such shareholder's holdings in such com-
pany were acquired prior to the making of such tender offer and prior
to such entity's knowledge that then an offer would be made, or unless
the corporation has been a Fully Qualifying Corporation since the
shareholder became a shareholder. Another possibility is to suspend
the automatic full capital gains treatment for sales of shares during
periods in which an offer to redeem is outstanding. Thus, a company
would be reluctant to attempt to redeem its shares unless such redemp-
tion would be a fully qualifying one. Since automatic capital gains
treatment on sales of shares is extended under the proposals made
earlier in this paper on the understanding that such treatment will result
in imputed ordinary gain upon liquidation if dividends have not been
sufficient, it seems wholly appropriate to suspend such privilege when a
76. See note 52 supra, where the need for additional legislation is explained.
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portion of the corporation's assets are permanently leaving the corpora-
tion without the required settling up.
The value of a dividend account under the proposed earned capital
gains concept will make necessary rules governing the carryover of such
attribute in the event of corporate divisions, mergers and other
reorganizations, and will make necessary rules governing other transac-
tions whereby individuals or corporations attempt to avoid the tax con-
sequences of the lack of a sufficient dividend account.
The shareholders of a corporation having a poor dividend history but
substantial asset value who wished to cash in their investment at capital
gains rates, and without recognition of imputed ordinary gain, would
attempt to find a purchaser for their shares. If such purchaser were
other than a corporation then there would be no objection to such tran-
saction since corporate assets would not thereby leave corporate solu-
tion and their future leaving of corporate solution by way of liquidation
or redemption would remain subject to the sufficiency of the dividend
account for any capital gains treatment and subject to imputed ordinary
gain. Earlier in this section,77 the possible ways of penalizing
shareholders who transferred shares to a tax-exempt entity in order to
avoid the tax consequences of an insufficient dividend account were
discussed. Would such measures apply if a shareholder sold all of his
or her shares to Corporation X in contemplation of liquidation and X
did in fact liquidate under section 332 and step-up the basis of the old
corporation's assets under section 334(b)(2)? The answer may differ
depending on the circumstances. If a corporation is closely-held, it is
difficult to believe that negotiations between seller and purshaser would
not cover all factors affecting the value of the seller's property, in-
cluding the intended use of such property by the purchaser. If the pur-
chaser expected a cost basis for its assets, as opposed to a continued
operation of the corporation in its present form, such fact would likely
be available to the seller. Clearly not covered by the above-described
methods for attempting to prevent the avoidance of tax by transfers in
contemplation of liquidation would be transactions in which the pur-
chasing corporation operates the sold corporation for several years and
then liquidates under Code section 332.
Sales to a corporation would of course be a problem under present
law because section 332 allows a corporation to receive a distribution in
complete liquidation of an eighty per cent subsidiary without recogni-
tion of gain or loss. Section 332 is a logical provision when one con-
siders subsidiaries of a corporation formed by its parent, but it makes
very little sense in the case of a corporation which purchases an existing
77. See pp. 129-32 supra.
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corporation which does not fully qualify for capital gains treatment for
its own exchange transactions. The dividend account of the purchased
corporation would be carried over as discussed immediately below.
It is suggested that section 332 should be amended so that upon
liquidation of a corporation which was not formed by its parent and
which was dividend deficient upon its purchase, the parent shall
recognize gain under section 331. Code section 243 must also be
amended to prevent a corporation from distributing the property of a
purchased subsidiary to itself over a period of time to avoid the conse-
quences of the proposed revision of section 332. The benefits of section
243 should be unavailable to a corporate purchaser of eighty per cent of
the shares of a Non-Fully Qualified Corporation, and all distribution by
such subsidiaries should be subject to treatment under section 301 as if
the parent were a non-corporate distributee until such time as the cor-
poration becomes a Fully Qualified Corporation (its dividend account
matches its net asset value). The amended sections 243 and 332 would
be inapplicable to such a corporate purchaser once its subsidiary
became fully qualified.78
Because of the danger of a corporation acquiring less than eighty per
cent of the stock of a Non-Fully Qualified Corporation and before
reaching eighty per cent causing such corporation to pay dividends to its
parent which qualify for the eighty-five per cent dividend deduction of
section 243, until sufficient dividends have been paid to make such cor-
poration Fully Qualified, it is suggested that section 243 be further
amended to be inapplicable to any distributions to a corporate
shareholder by a corporation which was non-fully qualifying on the
date such corporate shareholder became the owner, including attribu-
tion under section 318, of twenty per cent or more in value of the stock
of such distributing corporation. These further provisions of section
243 would not apply to shares received by a corporation in a tax-free ex-
change or after the time when the distributing corporation becomes a
Fully Qualifying Corporation.
A similar type of treatment could be used for tax-exempt purchasers
of stock in a Non-Fully Qualifying Corporation. Such a provision
would in effect say to tax-exempt entities, "your tax-exempt privilege
does not extend to certain transactions where you assist, knowingly or
unknowingly, the avoidance by individuals of the tax burden which
Congress wishes to impose on certain distributions of corporate
78. Thus if X Corporation purchased all of the stock of Y Corporation from the Y shareholders,
and if Y Corporation has a net asset value of $200 (fair market value minus total capital com-
ponent), a dividend account of $160, and earnings and profits of $20, then the distribution of a
$20 dividend by Y immediately after the purchase by X would make Y a Fully Qualified Corpora-
tion and would make the special provisions of the amended §§ 243 and 332 inapplicable thereafter.
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assets." No great burden is placed on tax-exempt entities by such a
provision since their exposure is determinable and fixed as of the date of
their purchase of a share.
Reorganizations create problems of how to carryover the dividend
account in a way which will prevent the trafficking in dividend
accounts. This is important so that the concept of a minimum require-
ment which must be satisfied to warrant full capital gains treatment
does not become a measure of maximum burden. It is suggested that in
a B or E or non-amalgamating F reorganization the dividend account
should carryover, with the B reorganization acquiring corporation be-
ing subject to the special provisions of sections 243 and 332 if the
acquired corporation were not fully-qualified on the date of the
transfer. A D reorganization constituting a "split-up" or involving the
transfer of operating assets only, rather than substantially all of the
transferor's assets would result in allocation of the dividend account as
with earnings and profits under section 312(i) of the Internal Revenue
Code. An A, C, D (not described in the preceding sentence), or
amalgamating F reorganization would result in a carryover of the divi-
dend account, but to the extent that the acquiror or acquiree (or both if
a consolidation) was not a Fully Qualified Corporation prior to the
reorganization, then the resulting entity's dividend account shall reflect
such prior deficits. Such post-reorganization deficits should be capable
of alleviation only by post-reorganization dividends which, pursuant to
regulations of the Commissioner, are determined to be attributable to
the assets of the pre-organization entity to whom the deficits are
attributable.
V. CONCLUSION
The present system of corporate-shareholder taxation favors
corporate liquidators, and provides no rewards to the continuing cor-
poration which submits to the double taxation of corporate gain. This
article has demonstrated that the double tax system can be
strengthened, and the bias against continuing corporations alleviated,
by allowing corporate distributions which are not dividends to be
treated as capital gains only to the extent that the gains on such distri-
butions are matched by lifetime dividend payments made by the
corporation.
Certainly, this proposal would introduce into the tax system some
new complexity. However, this proposal would make possible the
elimination of the extremely intricate and overly broad collapsible cor-
poration provisions. Thus, it may reasonably be argued that no overall
net increase in complexity would result by the proposal's adoption.
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One effect of this proposal would be the imposition of equal tax
burdens on like corporations or their shareholders regardless of the
manner in which the corporation is organized or its affairs conducted.
Finally, the proposal provides a much needed theoretical justification
for the preferential treatment of corporate distributions which are other
than dividends.
